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Abstract
The existing software development ecosystem is the product of evolutionary forces,
and consequently real-world software is amenable to improvement through automated
evolutionary techniques. This dissertation presents empirical evidence that software
is inherently robust to small randomized program transformations, or mutations.
Simple and general mutation operations are demonstrated that can be applied to
software source code, compiled assembler code, or directly to binary executables.
These mutations often generate variants of working programs that differ significantly
from the original, yet remain fully functional. Applying successive mutations to the
same software program uncovers large neutral networks of fully functional variants
of real-world software projects.
These properties of mutational robustness and the corresponding neutral networks
have been studied extensively in biology and are believed to be related to the capacity
for unsupervised evolution and adaptation. As in biological systems, mutational
robustness and neutral networks in software systems enable automated evolution.

v
The dissertation presents several applications that leverage software neutral networks to automate common software development and maintenance tasks. Neutral
networks are explored to generate diverse implementations of software for improving
runtime security and for proactively repairing latent bugs. Next, a technique is introduced for automatically repairing bugs in the assembler and executables compiled
from off-the-shelf software. As demonstration, a proprietary executable is manipulated to patch security vulnerabilities without access to source code or any aid from
the software vendor. Finally, software neutral networks are leveraged to optimize
complex nonfunctional runtime properties. This optimization technique is used to
reduce the energy consumption of the popular PARSEC benchmark applications by
20% as compared to the best available public domain compiler optimizations.
The applications presented herein apply evolutionary computation techniques to
existing software using common software engineering tools. By enabling evolutionary techniques within the existing software development toolchain, this work is more
likely to be of practical benefit to the developers and maintainers of real-world software systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We present empirical studies of the effects of small randomized transformations, or
mutations, on a variety of real-world software. We find that software functionality is
inherently robust to mutation. By successively applying mutations we explore large
neutral networks of fully functional variants of existing software projects. We leverage
software mutational robustness and the resulting neutral networks to improve software
through evolutionary processes of stochastic modification and fitness evaluation that
mimic natural selection. These methods are implemented using familiar tools from
existing software development toolchains, and yield several techniques for software
maintenance and improvement which are practical, widely applicable, and easily
integrated into existing software development environments.
We demonstrate multiple applications of evolutionary techniques to the improvement of real-world software, including automated techniques to repair bugs in offthe-shelf software and patch exploits in closed source binaries, techniques to generate
diverse implementations of a software specification, and methods to optimize complex
runtime properties of software. By combining the techniques of software engineering
and evolutionary computation this dissertation advances a shared research objective
of both fields: automating software development.
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We propose that the existing software development ecosystem is the product of
evolutionary forces, and is thus amenable to improvement through automated evolutionary techniques. We present empirical evidence of mutational robustness and
neutral networks in software—both of which are hallmarks of evolution previously
only studied in biological systems. We demonstrate multiple applications of evolutionary techniques for software improvement. The remainder of this section motivates
the work, highlights the main empirical results and practical applications, outlines
the organization of the remainder of the document, and provides instructions for
reproducing the experiments presented herein.
Motivation: Over the last fifty years the production and maintenance of software
has emerged as an important global industry, consuming the efforts of 1.3 million
software developers in the United States alone in 2008 [25]. This is projected to
increase by 21%, or to over 1.5 million by 2018 [25]. As it stands now, software
development is difficult, expensive, and error prone. Software bugs cost as much as
$312 billion per year [20], patching a single security vulnerability can cost millions
of dollars [152], and while data centers are estimated to have consumed over 1%
of total global electricity usage in 2010 [88], no existing mainstream compilers offer
optimizations designed specifically to reduce energy consumption.
Empirical Results: We find that existing software projects, when manipulated
using common software engineering tools, exhibit properties such as mutational robustness and large neutral networks which have previously been studied only in
biological systems. In such biological systems mutational robustness and neutral
networks have been shown to enable evolutionary processes to function effectively.
Our results suggest that the same is true of software systems.
Applications Evolutionary computation improves the fitness, or performance, of
a population of candidate solutions through an iterative cycle of random modification,
evaluation, and selection in a process greatly resembling natural selection [63, 64].
Evolutionary computation techniques typically begin with an initial population of
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Figure 1.1: Improving real-world software by applying evolutionary computation
techniques which are implemented using software engineering tooling.

randomly generated individuals. The methods of representation and the transformation operators of candidate solutions are often domain-specific and selected for the
particular task at hand [130].
This work improves an existing instance of software that is already close to optimal.1 Instead of using domain-specific representations and transformations (as in
most prior work in genetic programming), existing software engineering tools are used
to ensure applicability to the wide range of complex software used in the real world as
well as interoperability with existing software development environments. Building
on prior work using genetic programming to repair bugs in existing software [161, 96],
we adopt evolutionary computation techniques to support the software engineering
applications presented in later chapters.
Organization We present empirical results suggesting that today’s software engineering toolchain supports the operations required by evolutionary computation
techniques (Chapter 3; including previously unpublished work and work published
in Genetic Programming and Evolvable Machines (GPEM) [144]), and more specifi1 The

techniques studied herein more closely resemble evolution in natural systems than
traditional applications of evolutionary computation do. Biological systems do not create
new organisms from whole cloth but rather improve extant organisms.
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cally, the program representation, transformation operators, and evaluation functions
(Sections 3.1 and 3.2; including previously unpublished work and work published in
Automated Software Engineering (ASE) 2010 [143]). We show that software systems
have high mutational robustness and large neutral networks, which makes them
amenable to improvement through evolutionary processes (Section 3.3).
We next apply evolutionary techniques to a number of software engineering tasks
such as repairing bugs in off-the-shelf software (Chapter 5; published in Architectural
Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS) 2013 [141]),
patching vulnerabilities in a closed-source binary (Chapter 6; previously unpublished), generating diverse implementations of a specification (Chapter 4; published
in GPEM [144]), and reducing the energy consumption of popular benchmark programs (Chapter 7; published in ASPLOS 2014 [142]). We conclude with a discussion
of the outstanding challenges standing in the way of wider adoption of these techniques, possible steps to overcome these challenges, and a summary of the impact of
this work to date (Section 8).
We review the relevant literature (Chapter 2) and define the technical terms used
in this work (Glossary).
Reproducibility The tools, data, and instructions required to reproduce the
experimental results presented in this work are provided. Appendix A describes the
software developed for this research and includes pointers to supporting libraries
and the implementations of applications. Appendix B describes the data sets used
in the experiments, including multiple suites of benchmark programs. In some cases
the analysis that produced Figures and Tables is preserved in Org-mode files [41],
to support automated reproducibility [140], and links to these files are provided as
footnotes.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
This research builds upon previous studies of biological and computational systems.
The study of robustness and evolvability in biology provides the concepts and terminology with which we investigate the same principles in computational systems.
Moving from the biological to the computational, this chapter reviews the most
relevant results from prior work in biology (Section 2.1), evolutionary computation
(Section 2.2), and software engineering (Section 2.3). The final section of this chapter focuses on the immediate precursor work; the use of evolutionary techniques to
automatically repair defects in software source code (Section 2.4).

2.1

Robustness and Evolvability in Biology

The ability of living systems to maintain functionality across a wide range of environments and to adapt to new environments is unmatched by man-made systems. The
relationship between robustness and evolvability in living systems has been studied
extensively. This section reviews this field of study, highlighting the elements most
relevant to this dissertation.
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Living systems consist of a genotype and a phenotype. The genotype is the heritable information which specifies, or gives rise to the organism. The resulting organism
and its behavior, or interaction with the world, is the phenotype.
Both the genetic and phenomenal components have associated types of robustness. Genetic robustness, or mutational robustness, is the ability of a genotype to
consistently produce the same phenotype despite perturbations to its genetic material. Genetic robustness can be achieved in different ways and on different levels. At
the lowest level, important amino acids are over-represented in the space of possible
codon encodings of triplets of base pairs, making random changes to encoding more
likely to produce useful amino acids. Further, functionally similar amino acids have
similar encodings. As a result of these properties, many small mutations in amino
acid codings are likely to encode identical or similar amino acids [86], making the
organism more robust to mutations affecting amino acid encodings. At higher levels,
vital functions are often degenerate, meaning that they are implemented by diverse
partially redundant systems [43]. For example, in the nervous system no two neurons are equivalent, but no single neuron is necessary, resulting in a system whose
functionality is robust to small changes. Degenerate systems may be more evolvable
than systems which achieve robustness through mere redundancy [48, 163]. Finally,
many mechanisms have evolved that buffer environmental changes, e.g., metabolic
pathways whose outputs are stable over a wide range of inputs [157].
Environmental robustness is the ability of a phenotype to maintain functionality
despite environmental perturbations. Many of the biological mechanisms responsible
for environmental robustness improve the overall robustness of the organism and as a
result contribute to mutational robustness [98]. There is a strong correlation between
genetic and environmental robustness [84].
Mutational robustness appears to be an evolved feature because evolution tends
to increase the mutational robustness of important biological components [31, 164].
Although it is unlikely that mutational robustness is explicitly favored by natural
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selection as a protection against mutation (due to the low mutation rates in most
populations), it seems likely that it arose as a side-effect of evolution to enhance
environmental robustness [153].
In evolutionary biology fitness is the measurement of an organism’s ability to
survive and reproduce. Fitness landscapes are used to visualize the fitness of related
genotypes [165]. Typically one dimension of a fitness landscape encodes an organism’s
fitness as a scalar, and all other dimensions are used to represent genotypes. This
space of genotypes may be a high-dimensional discrete space in which each point is
a genotype and the immediate neighbors of each point are the genotypes that are
reachable by application of a single mutation to the original point.
A mutationally robust organism has many genotypes that map to phenotypes
with the same fitness [82]. Regions of the space consisting of genotypes with identical fitness are called neutral spaces [81], or neutral networks, and are depicted in
Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: Neutral spaces are subsets of an organism’s fitness landscapes in which
every organism has identical fitness.
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The relationship between mutational robustness and neutral networks and evolvability is complex [157, 156, 42]. Mutational robustness can be explicitly selected for
in static environments and selected against in dynamic environments [164, 111]. Periods of time without selection can increase mutational robustness [153], and periods
of strong directional selection can reduce mutational robustness [60].
Mutational robustness directly inhibits evolution by reducing the likelihood that
any given genetic modification will have a phenotypic effect. This inhibitory effect
can dominate at the small time scales of individual mutations. In some cases overly
large neutral networks can actually reduce evolvability [5]. However, large neutral
networks predominately promote evolvability. Populations tend to spread out across
neutral networks via a process called drift, accruing genetic diversity and novel genetic material [30, 145, 18, 99]. This accrued genetic material is believed to play an
important role in evolutionary innovation, and provides the genetic fodder required
for large evolutionary advances [155, 107, 125, 128, 3].

2.2

Evolutionary Computation

This section describes research into the application of evolutionary techniques in
computational systems. We describe the fields of digital evolution and evolutionary
algorithms. In digital evolution computational systems are used to perform experiments not yet feasible in biological systems. In evolutionary algorithms engineered
systems are optimized using algorithms which mimic the biological process of natural
selection.
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Digital evolution

Some of the research into evolutionary biology discussed in Section 2.1 rely on experiments not based on direct observation of biological systems, but rather on computational models of evolving systems. The evolutionary time frames and the degree
of environmental controls required for such experiments are not yet achievable in
experiments using biological systems. In digital evolution, much more control and
measurement is possible via computational models of evolving populations. These
models represent genotypes using specialized assembly languages in environments in
which their execution (phenotype) determines their reproductive success [126].
In addition to modeling biological evolution, work in digital evolution has generated hypotheses about those properties of programming languages that might encourage evolvability [124]. Although the languages, or chemistries, studied in these
computational environments are far from traditional programming languages, some
predictions do transfer, such as the brittleness of absolute versus symbolic addressing to reference locations in an assembler genome[124]. Work in the computer virus
community has produced similar research on the evolvability of traditional x86 assembly code [69]. One of the contributions of this dissertation is to support some
of these claims and intuitions while disproving others. For example, Section 3.3.2.5
confirms the brittleness of absolute addressing in Executable and Linkable Format
(ELF) files, while in Chapter 5 we find that x86 assembler (ASM) may be effectively
evolved, contrary the conclusions of the computer virus community.

2.2.2

Evolutionary Algorithms

Evolutionary algorithms, including both the genetic algorithms and genetic programming sub-fields, predate the work on digital evolution.
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Genetic algorithms are techniques which apply the Darwinian view of natural
selection [36] to engineering optimization problems [63, 113]. Genetic algorithms
require a fitness function which the algorithm seeks to maximize. A population of
candidate solutions, often represented as a vector, is randomly generated, and then
maintained and manipulated through transformations operations typically including
mutation and crossover.1 The algorithm proceeds in a cycle of fitness based selection,
transformation, and evaluation, which is usually organized into generations, until a
satisfactory solution is found or a runtime budget is exhausted.
Steady state genetic algorithms such as those used in Chapters 6 and 7 are not
organized into discrete generations, rather steady state genetic algorithms apply the
selection, transformation and evaluation cycle to single individuals [104]. New individuals are immediately inserted into the population and when the size of the
population exceeds the maximum allowed population size individuals are selected for
eviction. The use of a steady state evolutionary algorithm simplifies the implementation of genetic algorithms by removing the need for explicit handling of generations.
Steady state algorithms also reduce the maximum memory overhead to almost 50%
of generational techniques because of the interleaved individual creation and eviction. Of most relevance to this work, steady state algorithms are more exploitative
than generational genetic algorithms and are thus more appropriate in situations
which begin with a highly fit solution, such as in this work which uses evolutionary
techniques to improve existing software.
Genetic programming is a specialization of genetic algorithms in which the candidate solutions are programs, often represented as Abstract Syntax Trees(ASTs) [64,
89], and have been applied to a number of real-world problems [130, Chapter 12].
1 The

construction of an initial population “from scratch” is a significant difference between the practice of evolutionary algorithms and the application of natural selection in
biological systems, where the starting point of evolutionary processes is always a relatively
fit organism (cf. NK-studies [128]). The applications presented in the following chapters only work to improve extant software, and more closely resemble natural selection in
biological systems.
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Genetic programming languages are often much simpler than those used by human
programmers and rarely resemble regular programming languages, although in some
cases machine code has been evolved directly [91]. Recently genetic programming
techniques have been applied to the repair of extant real-world programs [161]. This
application is discussed at greater length in Section 2.4.
Genetic algorithms and genetic programming differ both in the way candidate solutions are represented (by using vectors and trees respectively [130, Chapter 2]) and
in the application to programs in the case of genetic programming. The work presented in this dissertation applies to existing programs as does genetic programming.
However, vector representations are often used, as they are in genetic algorithms. so
the blanket term “evolutionary computation” is used in this dissertation to avoid
confusion.
The performance of evolutionary algorithms are highly dependent upon the properties of the fitness landscape as defined by their fitness function. NK-studies have
been used to access the effectiveness of these techniques over tunable fitness landscapes [10, Section B2.7.2]. In these studies the values N and K may be tuned to
control the ruggedness of the landscape being searched. N controls the dimensionality of the space, and K controls the epistasis (the degree of interaction between
parts) of the space. Chapter 7 in this work explores the use of smoother fitness
functions than those used in prior chapters. Further discussion of fitness functions
are given in Sections 3.6.4 and 8.2.2.
Prior work in genetic programming has leveraged vector program representations applied to machine code. The limited amount of previous work in this field
falls into two categories. The first category guarantees that the code-modification
operators can produce only valid programs, often through complex processes incorporating domain-specific knowledge of the properties of the machine code being
manipulated [119, 127]. In the second approach, the genetic operators are completely
general and the task of determining program validity is relegated to the compiler and
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execution engine [91]. This dissertation takes the latter approach, and we find that
both compiler Intermediate Representations(IRs) and ASM are surprisingly robust
to naïve modifications (Section 3.3.2.5).

2.3

Software Engineering

This dissertation contributes to the larger trend in software engineering of emphasizing acceptable performance over formal correctness. We review recent work in this
vein and highlight tools and methods of particular interest.
Approximate computation encompasses a variety of techniques that seek to explore the trade-off of reduced accuracy in computation for increased efficiency. The
main motivation behind this work is the insight that existing computational systems
often provide much more accuracy and reliability than is strictly required from the
level of hardware up through user-visible results. Examples of promising approximate computation techniques include neural accelerators for efficiently executing
delineated portions of software applications [47], and languages for the construction
of reliable programs over unreliable hardware [27, 19].
In failure oblivious computing [134], common memory errors such as out-ofbounds reads and writes are ignored or handled in ways that are often sufficient
to continue operating but not guaranteed to preserve program semantics. For example, a memory read of a position beyond the end of available memory can be
handled in a number of different ways. The requested address can be “wrapped”
modulo the largest valid memory address. Memory can be represented as a hash
table in which addresses are merely keys and new entries are created when needed.
In this case reads of uninitialized hash entries can simply return random values. By
preventing common errors such as buffer overruns these techniques have been shown
to increase the security and reliability of some software systems. Failure oblivious
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computing assumes that in many cases security and reliability are more important
than guaranteed semantics preservation [132, 135, 102, 133].
Beal and Sussman take a similar approach proposing a system for increasing the
robustness of software by pre-processing program inputs [14]. Under the assumption
that most software operates on only a sparse subset of the possible inputs, they
propose a system for replacing aberrant or unexpected inputs with fabricated inputs
remembered from previous normal operation. This system of input “hallucination”,
is shown to improve the robustness of a simple character recognition system.
While the previous system learns and enforces invariants on program input,
the clearview system [129] learns invariants from trace data extracted from a running binary using Daikon [46]. When these invariants are violated by an exploit
of a vulnerability in the original program the system automatically applies an
invariant-preserving patch to the running binary, which ensures continued execution.
ClearView was evaluated against a hostile red-team and was able to successfully repair seven out of ten of the red team’s attacks [129]. Despite these impressive results
the ClearView system has a number of limitations. The tool used to collect invariants
(Daikon) is not exhaustive (e.g., missing polynomial and array invariants [118]), is
only able to detect a limited set of errors, is only able to repair a pre-configured set
of errors for which hand written templates exist, and is not guaranteed to preserve
correct program behavior.
The approaches mentioned above are applied to executing software systems.
There are also techniques that apply to the pre-compiled software source-code, or
genotype. One family of such techniques includes loop-perforation [112] and dynamic knobs [62]. In loop-perforation, software is compiled to a simple IR, looping
constructs are found in this IR and then modified to execute the loop fewer times
by skipping some loop executions. This technique can be used to reduce energy and
runtime costs of software while maintaining probabilistic bounds of expected correctness. This work is notable for introducing program transformations that are not
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formally semantics preserving but are rather predictably probabilistically accurate.
The impact of these techniques is limited to specific manually specified program
transformations, a more general method of program optimization, of which loop
perforation may be a special case, is given Chapter 7.
There is a common misconception that software is brittle and that the smallest
changes in working code can lead to catastrophic changes in behavior. This perceived
fragility is codified in mutation testing systems. Such systems measure program test
suite coverage by the percentage of random program changes that cause the test suite
to fail, and operate under the assumption that random changes to working programs
result in breakage [101, 39, 66, 74]. This usage presumes that all program mutants
are either buggy or equivalent to the original program.
The detection of equivalent programs is a significant open problem for the mutation testing community (cf. equivalent mutant problem [74, Section II.C]) [58].
Although the detection of equivalent mutants is undecidable [24], a number of tools
have been proposed for automatically finding equivalent mutants [120, 123, 138]. By
contrast, the techniques presented herein exploit neutral and beneficial variation in
program mutants for use in software development and maintenance. Recent work by
Weimer et al. [160], seeks to leverage work on equivalent mutants from the mutation
testing community to improve the efficiency of automated of bug repair.

2.4

Genprog: Evolutionary Program Repair

Genprog is a tool for automatically repairing defects in off-the-shelf software using
an evolutionary algorithm. It does not require a formal specification, program annotations, or any special constructs or coding practices. It requires only that the
program be written in C and be accompanied by a test suite [161, 96].
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XXXXX

Output

XXXXX
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Figure 2.2: Genprog automated evolutionary program repair (Le Goues [94, Figure 3.2]). Input includes a C program, a passing regression test suite, and at least
one failing test indicating a defect in the original program. The C source is parsed
into an AST which is iteratively mutated and evaluated. When a variant of the
original program is found which continues to pass the regression test suite and also
passes the originally failing test, this variant is returned as the "repair."

The Genprog repair process is shown in Figure 2.2. As input Genprog requires
the C source code of the buggy software, the regression test suite which the current
version of the software is able to pass, and at least one failing test indicating the bug.
The source is parsed into a C Intermediate Language (Cil) AST [116, 161], which
is then duplicated and transformed using the three mutation operations (shown in
Panels a-c of Figure 3.2) and crossover to form a population of program variants.
In an evolutionary process of program modification and evaluation, Genprog
searches for a variant of the original program which is able to pass the originally failing test case, while still passing the regression test suite. This version is returned by
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the evolutionary search portion of the Genprog technique. As a final post-processing
step the difference between the original program and the repair is minimized to the
smallest set of diff hunks required to achieve the repair. This minimization is performed using delta debugging, a systematic method of minimization while retaining
a desired property [166].
In a large-scale systematic study Genprog was able to fix 55 of 108 bugs taken
from a number of popular open-source projects. When performed on the Amazon
EC2 cloud computing infrastructure each repair cost less than $8 on average [95]
which is significantly cheaper than the average cost of manual bug repair.
Genprog has had a significant impact on the software engineering research community. The project won best paper awards at the International Conference on
Software Engineering (ICSE) in 2009, the conference on Genetic and Evolutionary
Computation (GECCO) in 2009, and Search-Based Software Testing (SBST) in 2009.
In addition it earned Humies awards for human-competitive results produced by evolutionary algorithms. In 2009 Genprog [161] and ClearView [129] demonstrated the
applicability of automated program repair to real-world software defects, and Orlov
and Sipper demonstrated a technique similar to Genprog over smaller Java programs [127]. Since then interest in the field has grown with multiple applications
(e.g., AutoFix-E [158], AFix [75]) and an entire section of ICSE 2013 (e.g., SemFix
and FoREnSiC [117, 87], ARMOR [28], PAR [79, 114]).
This dissertation is also a descendant of Genprog. The experiments described
in the following chapters investigate the mechanisms underlying Genprog’s success
(Chapter 3 [144]) and extend the Genprog technique into new areas such as repair
in embedded systems (Chapter 5 [141]) repair of closed source binaries (Chapter 6),
and optimization to reduce energy consumption (Chapter 7 [142]).
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Chapter 3
Software Representation, Mutation,
and Neutral Networks

In biological systems both mutational robustness and the large neutral networks
reachable through fitness-preserving mutation are thought to be necessary enablers
of evolutionary improvement as discussed in Section 2.1. This chapter describes a
series of experiments which demonstrate the prevalence of mutational robustness and
large neutral networks in software using the existing development toolchain.
Mutational robustness and neutral networks arise in systems with a genetic structure which support mutation and crossover and which give rise to a phenotype that
in turn supports fitness evaluation. This chapter defines multiple program representations and the mutation and crossover transformations they support (Section 3.1).
These representations include high-level Abstract Syntax Trees(ASTs), compiler Intermediate Representation (IR), assembler (ASM), and binary executables. Methods
of expressing these representations as executable programs and evaluating their fitness are given (Section 3.2).
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Software mutational robustness is present in real-world programs across multiple
levels of representation, regardless of the quality of the method of fitness evaluation
(Section 3.3; published in GPEM [144]). Large neutral networks are found and
their properties are investigated (Section 3.4; previously unpublished work and work
published in GPEM [144]). This chapter concludes with a mathematical analysis of
the fitness landscape defined by these program representations and of the resultant
neutral networks (Section 3.5; previously unpublished).

3.1
3.1.1

Representation and Transformation
Representations

In this dissertation we view a program’s representation as its genetic information,
which can be modified with mutation and crossover operations. As discussed in Section 2.1, program representations are typically hierarchical trees linear vectors. In
this dissertation we study both forms. By focusing on program representations which
are closely based upon structures used commonly in software engineering the implementations of many of these program representations are able to leverage existing
tools.
Specifically we will investigate two high-level tree program representations and
three low-level vector program representations. The tree program representations
include one based on Cil [96], and one based on C Language family frontend for
LLVM (CLang) ASTs [92]. The three lower-level program representations include
one based on argumented ASM code [143], one based upon Low Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) IR [93], and one program representation applicable directly to binary
ELF files [141]. This last representation is operationally similar to the ASM representation with additional bookkeeping required for all program transformations. The
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if ( a ==0){
printf ( " % g \ n " , b ); }
else {
while ( b !=0){
if (a > b ){ a =a - b ; }
else
{ b =b - a ; } } }
printf ( " % g \ n " , a );

if(a==0)
printf("%g\n",b);

while(b!=0)

a=a-b;

else
b=b-a;

(b) AST (Cil and CLang)

.file "gcd.c"

ELF\?

.globl main

ELF header

.type main, @function

program header table

main:
.cfi_startproc

section 1
...

.cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
.cfi_offset 6, -16

.text section
[55] [48 89 e5] [48 83 ec 20] [48 89 7d e8]
[89 75 e4] [83 7d e4 01] [7e 60] . . .

movq %rsp, %rbp

...

.cfi_def_cfa_register 6

section n

subq $48, %rsp

section header table

(c) Vector (Assembler and LLVM)

printf("%g\n",a);

if(a>b)

(a) Source

pushq %rbp
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(d) ELF

Figure 3.1: Program representations. The Cil and Clang tree representations are
shown in Panel (a). Panels (c) and (d) shown the ASM, LLVM, and ELF program
representations. The source code shown in Panel (a) is not used as a program
representation because of the lack of directly source-code level transformations (most
tools for source code transformation first parse the source into an AST which is then
transformed and serialized back to source).

five program representations are depicted graphically in Figure 3.1 and are described
in greater detail below.

3.1.1.1

CLang-AST

The highest level representation is based on ASTs parsed from C-family languages
using the C Language family frontend for LLVM (CLang) tooling. This level of
representation most closely matches source code written directly by human software
developers. This level of representation is used in Section 3.3.2.5.
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Cil-AST

The next highest level of representation is based on ASTs parsed from C source code
using the C Intermediate Language (Cil) toolkit to parse, manipulate and finally
serialize C source ASTs back to C source code [116, 161].
Cil simplifies some C source constructs to facilitate programmatic manipulation.
Despite these simplifications, the Cil AST representation more closely resembles a
high-level source code than a true compiler IR. This level of representation is used
in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 and in Chapters 4 and 5.

3.1.1.3

LLVM

The Low Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) representation operates over the LLVM
compiler IR, which is written in Static Single Assignment (SSA) form [93]. LLVM
supports multiple language front-ends making it applicable to a wide range of software projects.
A rich suite of tools is emerging around the LLVM infrastructure.1 This representation benefits from these tools because they can be easily applied to LLVM
program representations to implement fitness evaluation or program transformation.
This level of representation is used in Section 3.3.2.5.

3.1.1.4

ASM

Any compiled language is amenable to modification at the assembler (ASM) level.
This level represents programs as a vector of assembler instructions. Some compilers
support this translation directly, e.g., the -S flag to the GCC compiler causes it to
emit a string representation of ASM instructions. For our ASM program represen1 An

updated list of related publications is maintained at http://llvm.org/pubs/.
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tation, we parse this sequence of instructions into a vector of argumented assembly
instructions. This parsing is equivalent to splitting the output of the string emitted
by GCC -S on newline characters. This vector can be manipulated programatically
(e.g., by mutation and crossover operations) and serialized back to a text string of
assembly instructions [143, 141]. The ASM program representation handles multiple
Instruction Set Architectures(ISAs) including both Complex Instruction Set Computer (CISC) ISAs such as x86 and Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) ISAs
such as MIPS.
This level of representation is used in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 and in Chapters 5
and 7.

3.1.1.5

ELF

The Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) file format is a common format of compiled and linked library and executable files [151]. When the code in ELF files is
executed, it is loaded into memory and translated by the CPU into a series of argumented assembler instructions. Using custom tooling in combination with existing
disassemblers such as objdump it is possible to modify the sequence of assembler
instructions in an ELF file in much the same way as with the ASM program representation [141]. This level of representation is used in Section 3.3.2.5 and 3.4 and in
Chapters 5 and 6.

3.1.2

Transformations

Every program representation used in this dissertation supports the same set of three
simple mutation transformations (copy, delete and swap) and at least one crossover
transformation. These transformations are taken from previous work in the genetic
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programming community where they have been shown to be powerful enough to
evolve novel behavior [130, Section 2.4].
All four program transformations are simple and general. They do not encode
any domain knowledge specific to the program material they manipulate. They are
applicable to multiple program representations (e.g., AST or ASM), and to multiple
languages (e.g., x86 or ARM assembler) without modification. These transformations are plausible analogs of common biological genetic transformations, and are
commonly performed by human software developers [80].
None of these transformations creates new code. Rather they remove, duplicate,
or re-order elements already present in the original program. This design is based
on the intuition that most extant programs already contain the code required to implement any desirable behavior related to their specification. The benefit of limiting
the program transformations in this way is to limit the size of the space of potential
programs (Section 3.5).

3.1.2.1

Mutation

The mutation transformations are copy, delete, and swap. Copy duplicates an AST
subtree, or instruction in vector and inserts it in a random position in the AST
or immediately after a randomly chosen location in the vector respectively. Delete
removes a randomly chosen AST subtree or vector element. Swap exchanges two
randomly chosen AST subtrees or vector elements.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the mutation operators. ELF mutation operations are similar to ASM mutation operations, are described in greater detail in Section 6.2.2.1,
and are shown in Figure 6.2.
The LLVM transformations are more complex than the simple operations shown
in Figure 3.2. The LLVM IR requires that a valid data-dependency graph be main-
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(a) AST Delete

(d) Vector Delete

(b) AST Copy

(e) Vector Copy
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(c) AST Swap

(f) Vector Swap

Figure 3.2: Mutation transformations over both tree and vector program representations.

tained by all program transformations. Thus, the LLVM mutations must explicitly
patch this dependency graph, assigning inputs and outputs for all new statements
and replacing the inputs and outputs of all removed statements. Figure 3.3 illustrates the process for the delete and copy operations. These data dependencies that
we manipulate explicitly in the LLVM IR are managed implicitly at the ASM level
through the re-use of processor registers.

3.1.2.2

Crossover

Crossover re-combines two program representations and produces two new program
representations with elements from each parent in a process analogous to the biological process of the same name. In tree representations, one subtree of each parent
is chosen randomly and they are swapped. In the vector representation a two-point
crossover is used [37]. First, two indices which are less than the size of the smaller
vector are chosen, then the contents of the vectors between these indices are swapped.
Figure 3.4 illustrates both the tree and vector crossover transformations.
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i32 2

i32 2

x

x

i32 3 %0

i32 3 %0

%add

%add
x

%1

%2

x
%1

%mul

i32 3

%2
%mul

x
%3

24

printf

%add2
x

%3

(a) LLVM Delete

printf
(b) LLVM Copy

Figure 3.3: Illustration of transformations over LLVM IR. These transformations
require that the SSA data dependency graph be repaired after each mutation.

3.1.3

Implementation Requirements

Each level of representation places different requirements on how the software can be
programatically manipulated and what parts of the tool chain need to be available.

(a) AST Crossover

(b) Vector Crossover

Figure 3.4: Crossover transformations over tree and vector program representations.
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AST The Cil-AST and CLang-AST representations have the strictest requirements.
Manipulation at the AST level requires that the source code be written in C
(for Cil) or a C family language (for CLang) and be available. To express
AST programs as executables the entire build toolchain of the software must
be available.

ASM and LLVM The ASM and LLVM representations require that the assembler
or LLVM IR compiled from the original program be available. To express these
programs, the linking portion of a project’s build toolchain must be available.
Any language whose compiler is capable of emitting and linking intermediate
machine code or LLVM IR can use this representation level, making these levels
more broadly applicable than the AST representations.

In some cases, re-working a complex software project’s build toolchain to emit
and re-read intermediate ASM or LLVM IR is not straightforward because not
all compilers support such operations directly (e.g., g++ the C++ front end of
the GCC compiler collection).

ELF Any ELF file can be used as input for the ELF program representation. This
level of representation does not require access to the source code of the original
program. ELF representations can be serialized directly to disk for evaluation and do not require access to the original program’s build toolchain. For
these reasons the ELF representation is helpful for modifying closed source executables for which no development access or support is available. An example
application to a proprietary executable is given in Chapter 6.

Chapter 3. Software Representation, Mutation, and Neutral Networks

26

Key
Compile
Link
Modify
LLVM IR
Source

LLVM
Executable

Cil IR
ASM

CLang

Cil

ASM

ELF

Figure 3.5: Expression of program representations to executables. Gray solid boxes
represent traditional software engineering artifacts and red dashed boxes represent
program representations. Each program representation modifies a different point in
the process of compilation and linking of program code to an executable. In each case
only those stages of compilation and linking which are downstream from a program
representation are necessary for expression of that program representation.

3.2

Fitness Evaluation

Fitness evaluation in this context is a two-step process. The genotype must first be
expressed as an executable (Section 3.2.1), and is then later run against a test suite
so that the program phenotype can be evaluated (Section 3.2.2).

3.2.1

Expression

As with biological organisms, a program’s fitness is a property of its phenotype or
behavior in the world. To assess the fitness of a program, its representation must
first be expressed into a phenotype. Expression is shown in Figure 3.5 and varies by
program representation as follows.
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AST The Cil and CLang AST representations are first serialized back to C-family
source code. The CLang tooling produces formatted source code which is
identical to the input source. This source code is then compiled and linked
into an executable using the build toolchain of the original program.
Expression can fail if the compilation or linking processes fail, for example if
an AST violates either type or semantic checks performed by the compiler, or
references symbols that cannot be resolved by the linker. In these cases no
executable is produced.
ASM The argumented assembler instructions constituting the ASM and LLVM
genomes are serialized to a text file. This text code is then linked into an
executable using the build toolchain of the original program.
Expression can fail if the linker fails. This is commonly caused by sequences of
assembler instructions that are invalid or cannot be resolved by the linker. In
this case no executable is produced.
ELF The ELF representation genome is composed of those sections of the ELF file
that are loaded into memory during execution. These sections, along with the
remainder of the ELF file, are serialized directly into an executable on disk.
This process requires no external build tools.
Eliminating the compilation and linking steps for representations at the ASM and
ELF levels increases efficiency of evaluation as compared to the other levels. This
can dramatic affects the efficiency of techniques using these lower levels (cf. runtime
Section 5.4).

3.2.2

Evaluation

Evaluation entails executing the program against a test suite. This execution might
be evaluated for functional correctness, as in the applications presented in Chap-
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ters 4, 5 and 6, or for nonfunctional runtime properties, as in the application presented in Chapter 7.
During both functional and nonfunctional evaluation the programs that fail to
express executables are assigned the worst possible fitness value, typically positive
or negative infinity.

Functional Evaluation The goal of functional evaluation is to determine if the
program behavior is correct or acceptable. This is determined by its ability to
pass all of the test in the test suite. Functional evaluation does not actually
determine whether the evaluated program is semantically equivalent to the
original program. In many cases a fully functional program variant computes
a slightly different function, which is undetectable by the test suite.
Functional evaluation is not related to, nor does it provide any guarantee with
respect to, any formal program specification. In every case discussed in this
dissertation (and in the vast majority of real-world software) there is no written
or formal program specification. In these, cases the program’s test suite serves
as an informal specification. In the cases we present, excluding the repair of
proprietary software in Section 6 for which no test suite is available, the test
suite distributed with the program is used unaltered.

Nonfunctional Evaluation nonfunctional evaluation assesses the desirability of
the nonfunctional runtime properties of a program’s execution. Standard profiling tools are used to perform this evaluation. Section 7.1 presents a framework
designed to optimize nonfunctional fitness functions. Section 8.2.1 describes
additional software engineering tools that could be leveraged in future work to
target other types of diverse fitness functions.
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Software Mutational Robustness

Robustness is an important aspect of software engineering research, especially with
respect to the reliability and availability of software systems. In contrast to these
aforementioned types of phenotypic robustness, this section investigates a form of
genotypic robustness which we call software mutational robustness. Software mutational robustness refers to the functionality of program variants, or instances of
software whose genome has been randomly mutated.
Functionality is assessed using the program’s test suite as described in Section 3.2.2. We investigate the appropriateness of using program test suites to assess
program functionality and find that in the majority of cases test suites serve as a
useful proxy for a formal specification. We find that this result holds across a wide
range of test-suite qualities—where quality is measured using statement and ASM
instruction coverage. Borrowing a term from prior work in biology we call functional
program variants neutral variants. Neutral variants continue to satisfy the requirements of the original program as defined by the test suite. But, they often differ
from the original in minor functional properties such as the order of operations or
behaviors left unspecified by the program requirements, and nonfunctional properties
may differ from the original, e.g., run-time or memory consumption.
As a simple example, consider the following fragment of a recursive quick-sort
implementation.
if ( right > left ) {
// code elided ...
quick ( left , r );
quick (l , right );
}

Swapping the order of the last two statements like so,
quick (l , right );
quick ( left , r );
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or even running the recursive steps in parallel does not change the output of the
program, but it does change the program’s run-time behavior. We find that examples
of such neutral changes to programs are commonly and easily discovered through
automated random program mutation.
This section provides empirical measurement of software mutational robustness
collected across a wide range of real-world software spanning 22 programs comprising over 150,000 lines of code and 23,151 tests. These programs are broken into
three broad categories according to the properties of the test-suite. We find an average software mutational robustness of 36.8% and minimum software mutational
robustness of 21.2%. We see little variance in software mutational robustness across
categories or programs, and we find that the levels of mutational robustness are not
explained by the quality of a program’s test suite. Given these results we surmise
that software is inherently mutationally robust.

3.3.1

Experimental Design

This section defines software mutational robustness and describes the techniques used
to measure the software mutational robustness of a number of benchmark programs.
It will also describe the benchmark programs and their related test suites.

3.3.1.1

Software Mutational Robustness

The formal definition of software mutational robustness is given in Equation 3.1.
It is a property of a triplet consisting of a software program P , a set of mutation
operations M , and a test suite T : P → {true, false}. Software mutational robustness
written MutRB (P, T, M ) is the fraction of the variants P 0 = m(p), ∀m ∈ M for
which t(P ) (program P passes test t) is true ∀t ∈ T . For any program P, which can
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not be successfully expressed as an executable t(P ) is false ∀t ∈ T , so such programs
count in the denominator of MutRB (P, T, M ) but not in the numerator.

|{P 0 | m ∈ M. P 0 = m(P ) ∧ T (P 0 ) = true}|
MutRB (P, T, M ) =
|{P 0 | m ∈ M. P 0 = m(P )}|
3.3.1.2

(3.1)

Measurement of Software Mutational Robustness

In all experiments we use the generic mutation operations described in Section 3.1.2
with equal probability. We evaluate mutational robustness using the Cil-AST and
ASM program representations. All of the test suites used are those distributed with
the programs P , and are described in more detail along with the description of the
benchmark programs in Section 3.3.1.3.
Since exhaustive evaluation of all possible first-order variants (i.e., variants resulting from the application of a single mutation to the original program) is prohibitively
expensive (cf. Number of neighbors Section 3.5.2), the following technique is used to
estimate the mutational robustness of each benchmark program.
1. The original program is run on its test suite and each AST node or ASM instruction executed by the test suite is identified. AST identifying information is
collected by instrumenting each AST node to print an identifier during execution. ASM identifying information is collected by using a simple ptrace-based
utility2 to collect the values of the program counter during execution. These
program counter values are converted into offsets into the program data where
they identify specific argumented instructions in the ASM genome.
2. A total of 200 unique variants are generated using each of the three mutation
operations for a grand total of 600 unique program variants. Mutation operations are applied uniformly at random along the traces collected in Step 1.
2 https://github.com/eschulte/tracer
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Mutations are limited to portions of the programs exercised by the test suite
in order to avoid overestimating software mutational robustness by including
changes in untested portions of the program.
At the AST level, variants are considered unique if they produce a different
assembler when compiled with gcc -O2. Non-unique variants are discarded and
do not contribute to either the denominator or the numerator of the M utRB
fraction to avoid overestimating mutational robustness by counting obviously
equivalent mutants as neutral variants. To avoid overestimating mutational
robustness, variants which fail to compile are all considered unique and are
added to the denominator of the M utRB fraction.
3. Each successfully compiled unique variant is evaluated using the program test
suite. Time to execute the test suite is limited to within an order of magnitude
of the time taken by the original program to complete the suite. Variants which
exceed the time limit (e.g., because of infinite loops) are treated as having failed
the test. Only variants that pass every test in the test suite are counted as
neutral and added to the numerator of the M utRB fraction.
4. The fraction of unique variants that successfully compile and pass every test in
the test suite within the given resource limitations are reported as the software
mutational robustness.

3.3.1.3

Benchmark Programs and Test Suites

Our investigation includes 22 real-world software programs listed in Table 3.1. The
programs cover three groups including 14 open-source systems programs,3 four sorting programs,4 and four programs taken from the Siemens Software-artifact Infrastructure Repository.5
3 https://cs.unm.edu/~eschulte/repro/robustness.tar.bz2
4 https://github.com/eschulte/sorters
5 http://sir.unl.edu
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The systems programs were chosen to represent the low- to middle-quality test
suites which are typical in software development. The test suites used to evaluate
the mutational robustness of these programs are those maintained by the software
developers and distributed with the programs.
The sorting programs were taken from Rosetta Code,6 and were selected to be
easily testable. We hand-wrote a single test suite to cover all four sorting algorithms.7
The test suite covers every branch in the AST and exercises every executable assembler instruction in the assembler compiled from the program using gcc -O2.
The Siemens programs were selected to represent the best attainable test suites.
These programs were created by Siemens Research [67], and later their test suites
were extended by Rothermel and Harold until each “executable statement, edge, and
definition-use pair in the base program or its control flow graph was exercised by at
least 30 tests” [136]. Also among the Siemens programs, the space test suite was
created by Volkolos [154] and later enhanced by Graves [57]. The resulting space
test suite covers every edge in the control flow graph with at least 30 tests.

3.3.2

Results

We report the rate of mutational robustness (Section 3.3.2.1), an analysis of mutational robustness by test suite quality (Section 3.3.2.2), a taxonomy of neutral
variants (Section 3.3.2.3), an evaluation of mutational robustness across multiple
languages (Section 3.3.2.4) and an evaluation of mutational robustness across all five
program representations (Section 3.3.2.5).
6 http://rosettacode.org
7 https://github.com/eschulte/sorters/blob/master/bin/test.sh
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Mutational Robustness Rates

Table 3.1 lists estimated mutational robustness for each of the 22 benchmark programs

Across all programs and representations we find an average mutational robustness
of 36.8% and minimum software mutational robustness of 21.2%. These values are
much higher than what might be predicted by those who view software as fundamentally fragile. They suggest that for real-world programs there are large numbers of
alternate implementations which may easily be discovered through the application
of random program mutations. Although actual rates of mutational robustness in
biological systems are not available, these rates of software mutational robustness
are in the range of mutational robustness thought to support evolution in biological
systems [42, Figure 2].

There is little variance in mutational robustness across all software projects despite a large variance in the quality of test suites. At one extreme, even high-quality
test suites (such as the Siemens benchmarks, which were explicitly designed to test
all execution paths) and test suites with full statement, branch and assembly instruction coverage have over 20% mutational robustness. At the other extreme, a minimal
test suite that we designed for bubble sort, which does not check program output
but requires only successful compilation and execution without crash, has only 84.8%
mutational robustness. This suggests that software mutational robustness is an inherent property of software and is not a direct measurement of the quality of the test
suite.
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Program

Lines of Code
ASM
C

Test Suite
# Tests % Stmt.

Mut. Robustness
AST
ASM

Sorting
bubble-sort
insertion-sort
merge-sort
quick-sort

184
170
233
219

34
29
38
38

10
10
10
10

100
100
100
100

27.3
29.4
29.8
28.9

25.7
26.0
21.2
25.5

2419
922
18098
544

536
412
9126
173

4130
2650
13494
1608

81.7
94.4
91.1
96.2

21.2
34.4
37.7
33.5

25.8
29.1
32.1
25.9

18756

7000

15261

4249

28776
6128
6830
40226
34165
5951
299959

10929
147
2975
7970
3829
5575
59094

80406
44802
17026
22458
20567

15033
17203
8059
1732
4390

6
22
6
16
119
145
30
5
11
6
10
40
204
234
360
10
5

35.9
71.0
29.5
40.4
24.9
0.8
28.8
45.4
40.1
64.5
38.4
58.8
48.4
9.2
42.0
15.4
50.6

33.0
46.4
33.0
34.6
50.0
33.3
33.3
33.3
61.5
41.5
33.4
40.5
33.3
33.3
33.0
33.3
33.3

26.1
23.6
69.7
69.7
36.7
66.3
28.0
39.9
56.9
37.8
22.1
72.3
48.9
34.0
25.6
90.4
69.0

664100

158571

23151

40.9

33.9 ±10

39.6 ±22

Siemens [67]†
printtokens
schedule
space
tcas
Systems
bzip2 1.0.2
(alt. test suite)
ccrypt 1.2
(alt. test suite)
grep
imagemagick 6.5.2
jansson 1.3
leukocyte
lighttpd 1.4.15
nullhttpd 0.5.0
oggenc 1.0.1
(alt. test suite)
potion 40b5f03
redis 1.3.4
sed
tiff 3.8.2
vyquon 335426d
total/average

Table 3.1: The mutational robustness of 22 programs spanning three categories. The
“Lines of Code” columns report program size in lines of C source code and lines of
x86 assembly code. The “Test Suite” columns show the size of the test suite in terms
of test cases and the percentage of AST statements exercised by the test suite. The
“Mut. Robustness” columns report the rates of software mutational robustness. The
± values in the bottom row indicate one standard deviation. † Although the Siemens
benchmark suite claims complete branch and statement coverage, we find less than
100% statement coverage. This is due to our use of finer-grained Cil statements in
calculating coverage.

% Neutral Variants
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Figure 3.6: Mutational robustness by test suite quality. The simple sorting programs
in 3.6a have complete AST node and ASM instruction coverage. The Siemens programs in 3.6b have extremely high quality test suites incrementally developed by
multiple software testing researchers, including have complete branch and def-use
pair coverage. The Systems programs in 3.6c have test suites that vary greatly in
quality.

3.3.2.2

Mutational Robustness by Test Suite Quality

Figure 3.6 shows the mutational robustness of the 22 benchmark programs broken
into groups by the type and quality of test suite. The differences in test suites are
qualitative in the source of the test suites and quantitative in the amount of coverage.
Qualitatively:
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Sorting (Panel 3.6a) The sorting test suites all share a single test suite. This test
suite leverages the simplicity of sorting program specification and implementations to provide complete coverage with only ten tests.
Siemens (Panel 3.6b) The Siemens test suites were taken from the testing community where they have been developed by multiple parties across multiple
publications until each executable statement, and definition-use pair was exercised by at least 30 tests [67, 136].
Systems (Panel 3.6c) The systems test suites are taken directly from real-world
open-source projects. These test suites are those used by the software developers to control their own development and consequently reflect the wide range
of test suites used in practice.

Quantitatively the sorting test suite provides 100% code coverage at both the
AST node and ASM instruction levels. The Siemens programs provide near 100%
coverage and the systems programs provide 37.63% coverage on average, with a large
standard deviation of 19.34%.
Despite the large difference in provenance and quality, the mutational robustness
between panels differs by relatively little as shown in Table 3.2. The average values
are within 17% of each other, and the minimums of each group differ by less than
1%.
Sorting
Average Mut. Robustness 26.7%
Minimum Mut. Robustness 21.2%

Siemens Systems
29.8%
43.7%
21.2%
22.1%

Table 3.2: Average and minimum mutational robustness of benchmark programs by
group.
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Taxonomy of Neutral Variants

To investigate the significance of the differences between neutral variants and the
original program we manually investigated and categorized 35 neutral variants of
the bubble sorting algorithm. Bubble sort is chosen for ease of manual inspection
because of its simplicity of specification and of implementation.
We first generated 35 AST level random neutral variants of bubble sort. The
phenotypic traits of these variants were then manually compared to the original
program. The results are grouped into a taxonomy of seven categories as shown in
Table 3.3.
Number Category
1 Different whitespace in output
2 Inconsequential change of internal variables
3 Extra or redundant computation
4 Equivalent or redundant conditional guard
5 Switched to non-explicit return
6 Changed code is unreachable
7 Removed optimization

Frequency
12
10
6
3
2
1
1

Table 3.3: A Taxonomy of 35 neutral variants of the bubble sort sorting algorithm.

The categories are listed in decreasing order of frequency. Only categories 1
and some of the variants in category 5 affected the output of the program, either by
changing what is printed to STDOUT or by changing the final ERRNO return value. Both
affect program output in ways that are not controlled by the program specification
or the test suite.
While some of the remaining five categories affected program output, all but
category 6 and some members of category 4 affected the runtime behavior of the
program. Category 2 includes the removal of unnecessary variable assignments, reordering non-interacting instructions and changing state that is later overwritten or
never again read.
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Many of the changes, especially in categories 2, 3, and 4, produce programs that
will likely be more mutationally robust than the original program. These include
changes which insert redundant and occasionally diverse control flow guards (e.g.,
conditionals that control if statements) as well as changes that introduce redundant
variable assignments.
The majority of the neutral variants included in this analysis are semantically distinct from the original program. Only variants in categories 4, 5 and 6 could possibly
have no impact on runtime behavior and could be considered semantically equivalent. Instead, the majority of neutral variants appear to be valid implementations of
a program specification. In some cases these alternate implementations might have
desirable properties such as increased efficiency through the removal of unnecessary
code or increased robustness (e.g., the addition of new diverse conditional guards).
Subsequent work by Baudry further explores the computation diversity of neutral
variants [13], and finds sufficient computational diversity to support moving target
defense [72].

3.3.2.4

Mutational Robustness across Multiple Languages

To address the question of whether these results depend upon the idiosyncrasies of a
particular paradigm, we evaluate the mutational robustness of ASM level programs
compiled from four languages spanning three programming paradigms (imperative,
object-oriented, and functional). The results are presented in Table 3.4. The uniformity of mutational robustness across languages and paradigms demonstrates that
the results do not depend on the particulars of any given programming language.
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bubble
insertion
merge
quick
Avg.

C
C++
Imp. Imp. & OO
25.7
28.2
26.0
42.0
21.2
46.0
25.5
42.0
24.6±2.3
39.5±7.8

Haskell
OCaml
Fun. Fun. & OO
27.6
16.7
35.6
23.7
24.9
22.7
26.3
11.4
28.6±4.8
18.6±5.7
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Avg.
24.6±5.3
31.8±8.5
28.7±11.6
26.3±12.5
27.9±3.1

Table 3.4: Mutational robustness of ASM level programs compiled from four languages spanning three programming paradigms. “Imp.” indicates an imperative language, “Fun.” indicates a functional language and “OO” indicates an object oriented
language.

3.3.2.5

Mutational Robustness across Multiple Representations

This section compares the mutational robustness of the four sorting programs implemented in C across all five program representations. The tests and program
implementations used in this section are available online,8 as well as the code used
to run the experiment,9 and the analysis.10
Each of the four sorting algorithms (bubble, insertion, merge, and quick) are
represented using each of the five program representations (CLang, Cil, LLVM,
ASM, and ELF). Each of the resulting 20 program representations is then randomly
mutated and evaluated 1000 times.
Table 3.5 shows the average software mutational robustness across all four sorting
algorithms broken out by representation. The highest level representation is CLang,
which has by far the lowest level of software mutational robustness. The low mutational robustness of the CLang representation is likely an effect of the immaturity
of the CLang representation and transformations. It is possible that these trans8 https://github.com/eschulte/sorters
9 https://github.com/eschulte/sorters/blob/master/src/

software-mutational-robustness.lisp
10 https://github.com/eschulte/sorters/blob/master/src/
software-mutational-robustness.org
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Representation
CLang
Cil
LLVM
ASM
ELF

41

Software mutational robustness
3.12
20.95
35.05
35.23
15.78

Table 3.5: Software mutational robustness averaged across four sorting algorithms
broken out by each of the five program representations.

formations do not accurately implement the intent of the program transformation
operations. For example, an experienced CLang developer would likely produce functionally different delete or copy transformations of CLang ASTs than those defined
in the library used herein.11
In general the lower the level of program representation the higher the software
mutational robustness with the sole exception of the ELF representation which is
fragile due to the need to maintain the overall genome length, and the inability to
update literal program offsets.
Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of fitness values across all levels of representation. Each fitness is equal to the number of inputs sorted correctly from a test suite
of 10 inputs designed to cover all branches in each sorting implementation. As is the
case in biological systems [107], the fitness distribution is bi-modal with one peak
at completely unfit variants and another peak at neutral variants. This may help
explain the relative stability of software mutational robustness across test suites of
varying qualities found in Section 3.3.2.2.
In both biological and computational systems the bi-model fitness distribution
may be beneficial, because partially fit solutions are often particularly pernicious (cf.
anti-robustness [38]). Cancer cells in biological systems are not neutral are able to
survive and even thrive, and unfit variants in computational systems which are able
11 https://github.com/eschulte/clang-mutate
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Figure 3.7: Fitness distributions of first order mutations of sorting algorithms by
program representation.

to pass incomplete test suites are the most likely to cause problems for end users. It
is not yet clear if similar causes underlay this bi-modal distribution in biological and
computational systems.

3.4
3.4.1

Software Neutral Networks
Span of Neutral Networks

The previous experiments measured the percentage of first-order mutations that
are neutral. This subsection explores the effects of accumulating successive neutral
mutations in a small assembly program. We begin with a working assembly code
implementation of insertion sort. We apply random mutations using the ASM representation and mutation operations. After each mutation, the resulting variant is
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retained if neutral, and discarded otherwise. The process continues until we have
collected 100 first-order neutral variants. The mean program length and mutational
robustness of the individuals in this population are shown as the leftmost red and
blue points respectively in Figure 3.8a. From these 100 neutral variants, we then
generate a population of 100 second order neutral variants. This is accomplished
by looping through the population of first-order mutants, randomly mutating each
individual once retaining the result if it is neutral and discarding it otherwise. Once
100 neutral second-order variants have been accumulated, the procedure is iterated
to produce higher-order neutral variants. This process produces neutral populations
separated from the original program by successively more neutral mutations. Figure 3.8 shows the results of this process up to 250 steps producing a final population
of 100 neutral variants, each of which is 250 neutral mutations away from the original
program.

The results show that under this procedure software mutational robustness increases with the mutational distance away from the original program. This is not
surprising given that at each step mutationally robust variants are more likely to
produce neutral mutants more quickly, and the first 100 neutral mutants generated
are included in the subsequent population. We conjecture that this result corresponds to the population drifting away from the perimeter of the program’s neutral
space. Similar behavior has been described for biological systems, where populations
in a constant environment experience a weak evolutionary pressure for increased mutational robustness [153, 157, Chapter 16]. The average size of the program also
increases with mutational distance from the original program (Figure 3.8a), suggesting that the program might be achieving robustness by adding “bloat” in the form of
useless instructions [130, Section 11.3]. To control for bloat, Figure 3.8b shows the
results of an experiment in which only individuals that are the same size or smaller
(measured in number of assembly instructions) than the original program are counted
as neutral. With this additional criterion, software mutational robustness continues
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Figure 3.8: Random walk in neutral landscape of ASM variations of Insertion Sort.

to increase but the program size periodically dips and rebounds, never exceeding the
size of the original program. The dips are likely consolidation events, where additional instructions are discovered that can be eliminated without harming program
functionality.
This result shows that not only are there large neutral spaces surrounding any
given program implementation (in this instance, permitting neutral variants as far
as 250 edits removed from a well-tested < 200 LOC program), but they are easily
traversable through iterative mutation. Section 3.5 analytically explores the possi-
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ble sizes of these neutral spaces. Figure 3.8b shows a small increase in mutational
robustness even when controlling for bloat. Further experimentation will determine
if these results generalize to a more diverse set of programs subjects.

3.4.2

Higher Order Neutral Mutants

The previous section demonstrates the ability of automated techniques to explore
neutral networks by continually applying single mutations to neutral variants. While
this demonstrates the span of neutral networks far from an original program, it does
not address questions of the density of neutral variants in the space of all possible
programs (cf. program space Section 3.5).
To address this question we apply multiple compounding random mutation operations to an individual without performing intervening checks for neutrality. Such
higher-order random variants take random walks away from the original program in
the space of all possible programs. We then evaluate the percentage of these higher
order variants at different distances from the original program to see how the rate of
neutral variants changes with mutational distance.
We compare the rate of neutral variants along random walks to the rate of neutral
variants found along neutral walks which use the fitness function to ensure the walk
remains within the program’s neutral network as in Section 3.4.1. This empirically
confirms the utility of fitness functions in the search for neutral variants, as opposed
to suggested alternatives such as random search [59].
Finally we manually examine some interesting higher-order neutral variants which
have non-neutral ancestors, and discuss the implication of the low rate of such variants discovered through random search.
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Experimental Design

Using the ASM representation, an initial population of 210 is generated of firstorder neutral variants of an implementation of quicksort in C.12 This population is
allowed to drift (Section 2.1) by iteratively selecting individuals from the population,
mutating them and inserting only the neutral results back into the population. The
result is a neutral exploration which maintains the population size of 210 until a
fitness budget of 218 total fitness evaluations has been exhausted. The fitness and
mutational path from the original program is saved for every tested variant including
non-neutral variants.
The distribution of the number of individuals tested at each number of mutations from the original during the neutral search is saved. A comparison population
of 218 random higher-order variants is generated by repeatedly drawing from the
distribution of mutational distances resulting from the neutral search, and for each
drawn distance generating a random higher-order variant with the same order, or
mutational distance from the original. This results in two collections of 218 variants with the same distribution of mutational distances from the original program,
one generated through neutral search and the other through random walks. These
distributions are shown in Figure 3.9.
The software and input data used to perform this experiment is available online.13
The analysis is also available online.14

3.4.2.2

Neutrality of Random Higher-Order Neutral Variants

As shown in Figure 3.10 the experimental levels of neutrality at two, three, and four
random mutations removed from the original almost exactly match an exponential
12 https://github.com/eschulte/sorters/blob/master/sorters/quick_c.c
13 https://github.com/eschulte/sorters/blob/master/src/horns.lisp
14 https://github.com/eschulte/sorters/blob/master/src/horns.org
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Figure 3.9: The distribution of mutational distance from the original for populations
of higher-order variants collected using two methods: random walks and guided
neutral walks.

function decreasing at a rate equal to the mutational robustness of the original program. The highest order random neutral variant found in this experiment was 8
mutations removed from the original.

Exponential decay models the number of higher-order neutral variants which will
be found through random walks which are neutral at every intermediate step. The
very high correlation between exponential decay and the rate of neutrality decrease
along random walks indicates that most higher-order neutral variants are the product
of neutral lower-order ancestors. This may be an effect of the very high dimensionality of program spaces (cf. dimensionality Section 3.5), or of the difference in effective
dimensionality between the neutral space and the program space.
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Fraction of Variants which are Neutral
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Figure 3.10: Neutrality of random higher-order mutants by the number of mutations
from the original.

3.4.2.3

Comparative Neutrality along Random and Guided Walks

Figure 3.11 shows the comparative neutrality by mutational distance up to 100 mutations from the original program for both random and guided walks through program
space. By contrast the neutrality increases along guided neutral walks. This agrees
with the results presented in Section 3.4.1. By the sheer increase in viable higherorder neutral variants found through neutral search as compared to random search,
28,055 and 1,342 respectively, these results support the utility of a fitness function
in guiding search for higher-order neutral variants.

3.4.2.4

Analysis of Interesting Random Higher-Order Neutral Variants

Table 3.6 shows the percentage of a large collection of over 50,000 randomly generated higher-order neutral variants which are “interesting,” meaning that they have
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Figure 3.11: The neutrality by mutational distance from the original program for
both guided neutral and random walks through program space.

ancestors which were not themselves neutral. These variants are the results of random walks that wander off of the neutral network, and then subsequently wander
back on. As can be seen the majority of randomly generated neutral variants are the
result of random walks that never leave the neutral network. This agrees with the
results found in Figure 3.10.

Higher-Order Neutral Variants
Order Total Interesting Percentage
2 33787
139
0.41%
3 12458
153
1.23%
4 4478
107
2.39%
sum 50723
399
0.79%
Table 3.6: Percentage of over 50,000 randomly generated higher-order neutral variants that have non-neutral ancestors.
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Note that the percentage of neutral variants which are interesting (column “Percentage” in Table 3.6) increases as the order increases because the number of random
intermediate steps increases, each of which has a chance of being non-neutral.

The interesting variants may be further separated into those whose step back
onto the neutral network in a reversion of a previous mutation (i.e., a “step back”),
and those who return to a different position in the neutral network than the spot
of their exit. We find that roughly half

199
399

are not the result of such a reversion or

a “step back”. Of these many have fitness histories in which their ancestor’s fitness
values drop to zero or near zero and then slowly climb or suddenly jump back to
neutral.

Such cases of random walks which leave and then re-enter the neutral network
in a new place may actually find portions of the neutral network which are unreachable or are very far removed from the original program when restricted to neutral
walks. The extreme size of these networks make this possibility difficult to determine
experimentally.

Although these results indicate that it is possible to find new (possibly unconnected) portions of the neutral network using random walks, such interesting random
walks remain very rare. With 6% of random higher-order variants between 2 and 4
mutations removed from the original being neutral, 0.79% of those being interesting
and roughly 50% of those not being reversions we have 0.06 × 0.0079 × 0.5 = 0.0002
or 0.02% of all randomly generated higher-order mutants are truly interesting. This
result motivates the technique used in this Chapter and in Chapter 4 of restricting
explorations of program space to neutral networks in which functional neutrality is
used as the acceptance criteria for every step in the walk.
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Program Spaces and Neutral Network Analysis

This dissertation develops applications for automated software engineering which
rely on the discovery of alternate versions of existing programs through application
of program transformations to program representations as presented in Section 3.1.
Each of these program representations with its associated transformations defines a
program space. The applications described in Chapters 4 through 7 may be viewed
as methods of searching these program spaces. This section provides a mathematical
analysis of the size15 and properties of these program spaces.
The elements of program spaces are program instances, and the distance between
any two elements is their edit distance as calculated using the space’s mutation
operations.16 Each space has an associated size, or the number of different programs
which the representation is able to specify. Following the standard practice in analysis
of neutral spaces in biology, we set the dimensionality of the space equal to the
maximum length of a representation [157, 145], and the number of potential values at
each dimension (program spaces are discrete spaces) equal to the number of possible
distinct program elements (e.g., AST statements, ASM or LLVM IR instructions).
This approach has the undesirable property that the dimensionality of a space is not
constant. To keep dimensionality constant, every element of the genome is allowed
to take on an ∅ value indicating no element is present.
15 We

only consider programs of finite length resulting in finite size program spaces. We
believe this is a reasonable restriction. Any realistic application leveraging software neutral
spaces will place limits on the size of allowable programs as arbitrarily large programs are
generally not desirable.
16 These program spaces may be thought of and effectively modeled as metric spaces.
Technically program spaces are not valid metric spaces as not all of the mutation operations
are invertible. For example the effect of deleting the last instance of an instruction from
an ASM program can not be reversed because there’s no other instance remaining in the
program to be used by future copy operations. Despite this, the mutation operations can
easily be made invertible and cause the program spaces to behave as metric spaces. We do
not explore such altered mutation operations in this work because we do not believe the
added mutational overhead would be justified by a significant practical effect in mutation
operations behavior.
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program
bubble
insertion
merge
quick

Stmts.
all uniq.
21
18
20
18
29
25
26
23
24.00 21.00

Cil-AST
Neighbors
all
neut.
609 166.26
570 167.58
1160 345.68
949 274.26
822.00 238.44

Reach
7.1 × 10+26
3.8 × 10+25
1.1 × 10+41
7.7 × 10+35
1.7 × 10+32

Stmts.
all
uniq.
197
138
186
130
237
139
230
157
212.50 141.00

ASM
Neighbors
all
neut.
46689 11999.07
41571 10808.46
61146 12962.95
62675 15982.12
53020.25 12938.15

Reach
1.4 × 10+422
6.4 × 10+393
4.2 × 10+508
4.9 × 10+505
1.0 × 10+508

Table 3.7: Size of neighborhood of sorting programs. Results are given for both the
AST and ASM representations. The “Stmts.” columns give the number of statements
and number of unique statements. The “Neighbors” columns give the number of
immediate neighbors reachable by a single mutation, and the expected number of
neutral neighbors given the software mutational robustness calculated in Table 3.1.
The “Reach.” columns give the calculated size of the set of programs reachable from
the original program using the given mutation operations.

Table 3.7 presents analysis of the program spaces of the four sorting programs
used previously in this Chapter. This analysis includes calculations of neighborhood
sizes, calculations of the sizes of neutral networks and sizes of reachable sets. The
methods for calculating these values are given in the remainder of this section.

3.5.1

Size of Program Space

Given a program space P with a program length limit of L and a total of U unique
elements, the total size of P is P = (U + 1)L . One is added to U to account for
removed statements, and the result is raised to the program length because every
slot in the program length may take any of U + 1 possible values. This holds strictly
for the vector representations, but does not take into account differences in possible
tree structures at the AST level.17
17 The

number of possible binary trees of N nodes is equal to the Nth Catalan Number.
Unfortunately calculation of the number of possible tree structures of valid ASTs depends
on a number of other factors, for example not all elements of ASTs (only conditionals) can
be branch points (and not all elements can live under conditionals, e.g., function definitions can not). The calculations in the remainder of this section are restricted to vector
representations.
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To develop intuition about the size of these program spaces, we can calculate the
size of the space of ASM programs written in MIPS assembler of length L = 10, 00.
Every MIPS instruction is 32 bits long, so there are at most 232 possible argumented
MIPS instructions. Including ∅ statements, there are 232 + 1 possible values for each
element of the program representation. For a 10,000 instruction program this results
in a program space which is 10, 0002

32 +1

elements long. These program spaces are

unfathomably large, and it is very likely that only small fractions of these spaces
encode useful programs. This motivates the decision in this dissertation to improve
upon existing software artifacts rather than attempting to synthesize wholly new
instances of software.

3.5.2

Number of Neighbors

The number of neighbors is equal to the number of transformations which generate
unique programs. Let l = length(P ) be the length of the original program and u
be the number of unique elements in the original program. The number of unique
neighbors is equal to the number of possible deletes plus the number of possible
unique copies plus the number of possible unique swaps. It is impossible that any two
different mutation operations (e.g., a swap and an copy) produce the same program,
because they each generate a different number of elements in the new program (i.e.,
l − 1 for deletes, l for swaps, and l + 1 for copies).
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There are l possible delete operations, no two of which result in identical pro
grams.18 There are roughly u × l possible copy operations,19 and 2l possible swap

operations so the number of neighbors N (P ) ' 2l + lu + 1.
Table 3.7 shows the size of the neighborhood for each sorting program. Even
for very small programs the sizes are quite large with 822 and 53020.25 immediate
neighbors for each sorter on average at the AST and ASM levels respectively. Given
that these neighborhoods grow exponentially with the length of the program, the
number of immediate neighbors will be very large for typical programs of sizes much
larger than the sizes of sorters.
In Table 3.1 we empirically measured the rates of software mutational robustness
for each sorter. By multiplying the neighborhood size by the rate of software mutational robustness from Table 3.1 we can estimate the total number of first order (i.e.,
separated from the original program by a single mutation) neutral variants for each
sorting program. These estimates are shown in the “Neighbors” columns of Table 3.7.

3.5.3

Reachability

An important property of each level of representation is the fraction of the program
space that is reachable from any given starting program, and the length of the shortest edit path to reach that position. Given an initial program p in a program space
P , where p has u unique elements and P has e possible elements and a maximum
program length of l, the total size of P is |P | = (e + 1)l , and the number of programs
reachable from p or R(p) to be R(p) = (u + 1)l .
18 Given

that delete is represented by overwriting the deleted element with a special null
element, cases that would normally lead to equivalent programs (e.g., deleting one in a
series of identical elements) generate unique program representations.
19 Technically there, are likely fewer unique copy operations, because copying instruction
e1 either before or after another e1 instruction produce an identical result. Section 3.5.4
contains more exact calculations of neighborhood in a program space defined by a reduced
set of mutation operations.
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Every program representation includes inline literals (e.g., 32-bit integers), so
any real-world programs p will contain only a small fraction of all possible program
elements (e.g., possible C statements at the AST level) or u < e. Thus, a search
starting from most programs at these levels will cover only very small portions of the
total program spaces in which they exist so R(p) << |P |.
Leaving literals aside, lower level program representations with smaller instruction
sets such as LLVM and CISC ASM, will have much greater coverage of possible
program elements. Because of the increased length of most programs in LOC at
lower levels (e.g., over a 3× more ASM instructions than AST statements found in
Table 5.1), search at the lower levels will often have access to much larger fractions
of the total program space and are much less constrained by the original program
from which any individual search starts.

3.5.4

Density of Neutral Networks

The question of the total size and density of neutral networks in the program space
requires a more analytically tractable model of program space than we’ve used for our
calculations and estimates thus-far in Section 3.5. Namely a space is required where
the number of mutation operations leading to identical variants may be determined
analytically.
In this section we define such a rigid program space based upon the same fixedlength vector program representation, but using a single mutation operator. We calculate the number of new program representations encountered in successive steps
through this space. We provide mappings between this rigid space and the space
of ASM programs allowing us to project calculations from rigid space to gls:asm
program space. Finally we combine these into an expression of the total size of a
program’s neutral space under the assumption of nearly constant mutational robustness along random walks through the neutral network.
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Rigid Space

The rigid program space uses the same vector program representation used previous
in Section 3.5. Each program is represented as a vector of length d (the dimensionality). In this section the dimensionality will be equal to the length of the original
program, so the space will only hold programs of equal or lesser length. This is not
a practical limitation as demonstrated in our empirical investigation of the span of
neutral networks when program length is limited shown in Figure 3.8b.
The elements which may appear in program vectors are taken from the set E
of all possible elements with the set containing the empty set ∅. Placing ∅ into a
program index is equivalent to deleting the contents of that index. The total size of
E is e.
A single mutation operation is defined in this space. This operation is called
“replacement”. Given a variant p, an index i ≤ d, and an element e ∈ E, replacement
sets p[i] ← e. All of the operations defined over vector representations in Section 3.1
may be implemented using only replacement. In addition replacement is ergodic,
making this program space a true metric space.

3.5.4.2

Step Wise Expansion in Rigid Space

The number of unique neighbors accessible through successive applications of replacement to the original program in this space may be calculated using the following
recurrence relation. Note that every variant is reachable from the original program in
at most d applications of replacement (or replacement of every index in the program
vector).

ni+1 =

ni (d − i)(e − 1)
(i + 1)

(3.2)
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The variable d is the dimensionality of the program space and e is the number
of elements (including ∅) which any program dimension may take.
Intuitively, the components of Equation 3.2 have the following meanings
ni The number of elements of the last expansion. Each element of ni+1 will be
accessible by a single application of the replacement operation to one of these
elements.
(d − i) The number of dimensions at which each element of ni may be mutated. No
member of ni may be mutated on any of the i previously mutated dimensions
and yield a new variant.
(e − 1) The number of new elements which each mutated dimension may take.
(i + 1) Division by this term accounts for the property of the space that each element
of ni+1 is reachable from (i + 1) members of ni .
For every i ≤ d, the number of variants exactly i applications of replacement from
the original program is given by n(i). The value n(0) = 1 as only the original program
is 0 mutations from the original. Figure 3.12 illustrates these sets of programs in a
space in which d = 3 and e = 5. The original program is placed on the origin for
clarity.
The sets n(i), ∀i ≤ d are mutually exclusive and partition the program space. The
P
sum of every n(i) is equal to the total number of elements in this space i≤d ni = ed .

3.5.4.3

Mappings Between ASM and Rigid Space

There is not a one-to-one mapping from the members of the rigid space defined in
this Section to unique ASM programs. Instead, there is a many-to-one mapping with
multiple members of this rigid space mapping to the same ASM program. Specifically
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(a) n(0) = 1

(c) n(2) =

n1 (3−1)(5−1)
(1+1)

(b) n(1) =

= 48

n0 (3−0)(5−1)
(0+1)

(d) n(3) =
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= 12

n2 (3−2)(5−1)
(2+1)

= 64

Figure 3.12: The variants accessible through 0, 1, 2, and 3 applications of replacement
to an original program in a space with 3 dimensions and 5 possible elements.

this is due to the use of ∅ elements in this space which are removed to generate the
ASM related program.

These ∅ elements may be placed in any places in rigid space program. Thus the
number of rigid space programs which map to any given ASM program is equal to
the difference between the length of that program and the length of the original
program.
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Given an element of ASM of size k, where k ≤ d (d is the size of the original)

and k+j=d, that element of ASM will have jl projections into rigid space (equal to
the number of slots at which an ∅ could be placed in the genome). As a result, an
−1
element of rigid space with j ∅ elements will only represent jl
of an element in
ASM space.
In order to translate the sizes of successive steps in expansion in the rigid space
to numbers of programs in ASM, we need to determine the number of elements of
each expansion ni which have z ∅ elements.
For each expansion i, let nz,i be the number of programs with z ∅ elements in step
i. The first program has no ∅ elements, so n0,0 =1. Given this, we know that n0,1 =
n1 - n1,1 , and n1,1 =d, because there is one variant in n1 with an ∅ element for each
mutated dimension in the original program.
This leads to the recurrence relation given in Equation 3.3. The number of elements of nz,i+1 is composed of elements of nz−1,i which gain an ∅ in a new dimension,
plus elements of nz,i which do not gain an ∅ in a new dimension. It is not possible for
an element of nz+1,i to lose an ∅, because that would require a repeated mutation in
an already mutated dimension. We still have to compensate for duplication, which
is accomplished through division by i+1.

nz,i+1 =

nz−1,i (d − i)1 + nz,i (d − i)(e − 2)
i+1

(3.3)

Once we know how many elements of each step have each number of ∅, we may
then find the cardinality of the projection of any given step i into ASM space, A in
Equation 3.4.

Ai =

X
z≤i

 −1
l
nz,i
z

(3.4)
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Total Size of Neutral Networks

We assume that a single value of software mutational robustness holds for each step
of expansion in the rigid program space. Let r be the rate of software mutational
robustness. We may then calculate the total number of neutral variants in ASM.
For each i ≤ d we may calculate the number of neutral variants in ni in rigid space.
These sizes may then be converted to cardinalities of the ASM programs mapped to
by elements of ni as in Equation 3.5.

Ai = r

i

X
z≤i

 −1
l
nz,i
z

(3.5)

The sum of these cardinalities ∀i ≤ d will be the total number of neutral variants
of the original program in ASM is R in Equation 3.6, with nz,i is calculated using
Equation 3.3.

R=

X
i≤d

r

i

X
z≤i

 −1
l
nz,i
z

(3.6)

The expression in Equation 3.6 for the total number of neutral variants of a
program in a program space of a given size has a number of important implications.
Every possible optimization of the original program (such as those found using the
technique described in Chapter 7) will be a member of this large neutral network.
Similarly, refinements of the program specification which preserve existing behavior
will be constrained to points within this large neutral network.
Previous work by Martinez and Monperrus analyzing program space concludes
that program repairs requiring more than ≥ 5 or ≥ 10 steps in program space are
impossible to find through automated search [106]. In light of the analytic expressions
for the size of neutral spaces presented in Equation 3.6, this prior analysis should be
redone to give the chance of finding any point in the neutral network of the repaired
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program, rather than the chance of finding a single unique instance of the repaired
program.

3.6

Discussion

The results presented in this chapter contradict the prevailing folk wisdom that
software is a precise and intentionally engineered mechanism, which is brittle to
small perturbations. We find software to be robust to random mutations, malleable
within extensive neutral networks. In this section we discuss a number of implications
of this change in perspective.

3.6.1

Evolutionary Provenance of Software

Over the past fifty years software developers have been selecting, reusing, and modifying efficient and robust software development tools, code, and design patterns.
Like their biological counterparts, software artifacts which have stood the test of
time including applications, interfaces, operating systems, programming languages,
utilities, libraries, compilers and linkers all display both robustness and adaptability
(in some cases to the exclusion of engineering quality [56]). The history of the existing software development ecosystem can be viewed as an evolutionary process, albeit
one in which human engineers are the mechanisms of both mutation and selection [1].
Ultimately, software may stand with biological organisms as a second example of an
evolved complex system.
This history of development, through a process mirroring natural selection, has
produced the surprisingly biological features of software which were empirically
demonstrated in this chapter and will be applied in the remaining chapters.
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Program Syntactic Space
5 Specification
(acceptable)
Killed Mutants
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Figure 3.13: Syntactic Space of a Program. The set of programs satisfying the program specification are shaded blue (left), the set of programs passing the program’s
test suite are shaded red (right), and the set of equivalent programs are shown in
green (center). Three classes of mutants are shown and labeled.

3.6.2

Re-interpretation of Mutation Testing

Many of the techniques presented in this chapter mirror those used in mutation
testing [74]. However this dissertation makes a fundamentally different interpretation
of the value and semantic stature of neutral mutants.
Figure 3.13 shows the syntactic space surrounding a program. This is similar to a
fitness landscape; each point in the space represents a syntactically distinct program,
and each program is associated with a semantic interpretation although that is not
shown in the figure. Randomly mutating a program’s syntactic representation can
have several possible semantic effects, which are shown in the figure.
This highlights an alternative interpretation of our results: for every specification
there exist multiple non-equivalent correct implementations. This emphasizes a dif-
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ferent view of software from that of the mutation testing technique, namely, that for
every program specification, all correct implementations are semantically equivalent.
To see how this follows from mutation testing, assume that ∃ programs a and b
s.t. a is not equivalent to b (a 6= b) and both a and b satisfy specification S. Without
loss of generality let a be the original program and b be a mutant of a. Let T be a
test suite of S. According to Offut [123] there are two possibilities when T is applied
to b. Either “the mutant is killable, but the test cases is insufficient” or “the mutant
is functionally equivalent.” The former case is impossible because b is assumed to
be a correct implementation of S and thus should not be killed by any test suite of
S. The later case is impossible because we assume a 6= b. By contraction, ∀ a and b
satisfying the same specification S, a = b or ∀ specification S ∃!a s.t. a satisfies S.
Non-equivalent neutral mutants require a significant amount of developer attention. Each requires changes to the program test suite and possibly changes to the
program specification and to the original program. The problem of differentiating
between equivalent and non-equivalent mutants is termed the equivalent mutant problem, and is a significant problem in the practice of mutation testing (cf. equivalent
mutant problem [74, Section II.C]). Such mutants are often not easily discriminated,
taking an average of 15 minutes in one user study [58], and is only done correctly
80% of the time [2]. Beyond the problem of determining equivalence, it is not clear
that adding tests to distinguish non-equivalent mutants is a useful way to drive test
suite development [53].
Although these problems are well known, we were unable to find formal publications that experimentally identify the fraction of equivalent mutants (aside from work
explicitly targeting Object-Oriented mutation operators which generate particularly
high rates of equivalent mutants [146, 138, 122]).
Through our own review of the mutation testing literature we collected unreported counts of equivalent mutants from a number of papers [53, 121, 120, 40] that
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Acronym
aar
abs
acr
aor
asr
car
cnr
crp
csr
der
dsa
glr
lcr
ror
rsr
san
sar
scr
sdl
src
svr
uoi
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Description
array reference for array reference replacement
absolute value insertion
array reference for constant replacement
arithmetic operator replacement
array reference for scalar variable replacement
constant for array reference replacement
comparable array name replacement
constant replacement
constant for scalar variable replacement
DO statement end replacement
DATA statement alterations
GOTO label replacement
logical connector replacement
relational operator replacement
RETURN statement replacement
statement analysis (replacement by TRAP)
scalar variable for array reference replacement
scalar for constant replacement
statement deletion
source constant replacement
scalar variable replacement
unary operator insertion

Table 3.8: The Mothra mutation operators used in the landmark Mothra mutation
testing system. Adapted from Table 1 of King et al. [83].

all used the Mothra [83] mutation operators and that found equivalent mutant rates
of 9.92%, 6.75%, 6.24% and 6.17% respectively, indicating that equivalent mutants
are common, but are less frequent than neutral variants.
The Mothra mutation operations are shown in Table 3.8. Mothra mutations are
specific to the Fortran programming language are typically more specific than those
used in this work. Mothra mutations include operations for constant, variable or
array replacement which may be implemented using combinations of our copy and
insert, and Mothra includes operators analogous to our own delete and copy (sdl
and uoi in Table 3.8).
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Of those categories of neutral variants described in Table 3.3, only categories
4, 5 and 6 could possibly have no impact on runtime behavior and could possibly
be equivalent under Offut’s strict definition of equivalence. Under the mutation
testing paradigm, tests would be constructed to “kill” the remaining 29 of 35 neutral
mutants. Given the sorting specification used (namely to print whitespace separated
integer inputs in sorted order to STDOUT separated by whitespace), none of these
classes of neutral mutations could be viewed as faulty. Consequently, any such extra
tests constructed to distinguish them (e.g., for mutation testing) would over-specify
the program specification. Rather than improving the test suite quality, such overconstrained tests could potentially judge future correct implementations as faulty.
In Chapter 4 we present an alternative to mutation testing which changes basic
paradigm. Instead of immediately analyzing neutral variants manually, they are either deployed in an N-version scenario, or saved to aid in future debugging. This
approach postpones the manual work of analyzing equivalent mutants (possibly forever), significantly reducing the burden on developer time. The alternative paradigm
is discussed further in Section 4.3.

3.6.3

Legibility of Transformations

If automatically generated program transformations are to be incorporated into ongoing software development, they may need to be communicated back to software
developers. This communication process is also important for manual review of
evolved program adaptations. The legibility of program transformations differs for
each level of representation. In general, transformations are less legible at the lower
levels of program representation. Each representation is discussed in turn below.

CLang-AST Mutations at the CLang level provides the best legibility. Changes to
the CLang AST may be automatically converted to source-level diffs which are
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properly indented and ready for either manual developer review or for direct
application to program source.
Cil-AST Mutations at the AST level may be presented as differences in Cil processed source code, which are easily (if not automatically) translated into source
level diffs. These changes can easily be applied to the original source code for
integration into the software project moving forward.
LLVM and ASM Mutations at these levels are applied to either LLVM IR or compiled assembler code. Changes in program variants may easily be represented
as assembler or IR diffs. Such diffs do allow for manual developer review,
however, many software developers are not able or inclined to read such lowlevel languages, which are mainly written by compilers rather than by human
developers.
Many compilers provide options to map specific assembler instructions to specific lines of code in the original program. In these cases it is easy to find the
location of modifications in the source (e.g., using the -c -g -Wa,-ahl=out.s
flags to gcc), however the content of the modification is often not easily, or
not possibly, translated to the source code level, so there is currently no clear
way to integrate changes at the LLVM or ASM levels into a software project
for future use.
ELF Mutations in ELF representations which take place in the executable portion
of the ELF file may be translated into changed assembler instructions using a
disassembler such as objdump (part of the GNU Binutils collection20 ). In these
cases ELF modifications are as legible as ASM modifications. In other cases
ELF modifications will occur either in the data portion of an executable, or
will not be easily disassembled, in which case manual review becomes a more
difficult forensic exercise.
20 http://www.gnu.org/software/binutils
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Functional vs. Nonfunctional Evaluation

Nonfunctional evaluation leads to smoother fitness landscapes that are more
amenable to search using evolutionary algorithms, as discussed in Section 2.1. The
fitness evaluations described in this work that rely on the test suite of the original
program return fitness values from a discrete set. This leads to a stepped fitness
landscape composed of flat plateaus which provide no guidance to the evolutionary
computation technique except at plateau boundaries. By contrast, the fitnesses returned by nonfunctional evaluation techniques (normally software profilers) are often
continuous, and provide the gradients which evolutionary computation techniques are
able to climb.
Function and nonfunctional properties of software are analogous to discrete and
continuous, or quantitative, traits of biological organisms respectively. Discrete traits
of biological organisms express phenotypes in a finite number of discrete classes and
are often controlled by one or a few genes. Continuous traits are generally controlled
by hundreds of genes, and are more common than discrete traits.
Chapter 7 presents an application that leverages the beneficial aspect of nonfunctional fitness evaluation. Section 8.2.2 posits possible techniques with which to
address this limitation of current methods of functional fitness evaluation.
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Chapter 4
Application: Program Diversity

Through the automated exploration of software neutral networks as in Section 3.4.1,
large number of alternate implementations of programs, program variants, may be
automatically generated. Such variants may be collected to form large populations
of diverse implementations of a program. This process results in a novel form of
artificial diversity.
Automated techniques of generating program variants with runtime or phenotypic diversity are collectively called artificial diversity [51]. These techniques make
computer systems more secure against attack by making it harder to find, reproduce,
and transfer exploits between machines. Such techniques typically involve randomizing some aspect of a computation; e.g., stack frame layouts [34], instruction set
numbering [12], or address space layouts [147].
Unlike previous work in artificial diversity, neutral variants provide implementation diversity [33]. By randomizing implementation choices in the program rather
than execution choices controlled by the operating system or environment, populations of neutral variants potentially offer increased security and may also potentially
repair semantic defects present in the original program.
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In this chapter we demonstrate that populations of diverse neutral variants can
provide sufficient diversity to proactively repair latent defects in a program. In
one possible use case, large populations of neutral variants could be retained by
developers and used retroactively to quickly repair new bugs as they are discovered.
When developers become aware of a new bug, the population could be checked
quickly for variants that repair the bug.1 If such variants exist they could be used
to pinpoint the bug, and suggest a patch. This would be of practical benefit because
developers are able to repair bugs more quickly with the help of such machinegenerated diffs [159].
This chapter introduces an application of neutral networks in the automated generation of implementation diversity. The utility of neutral program variants to repair
latent defects is accessed using held-out defects seeded into benchmark programs according to known fault distributions.
This work appeared in GPEM [144].

4.1

Methodology

We access the degree to which populations of neutral program variants may proactively repair bugs latent in an original program. We proceed by seeding latent bugs
into real-world software, generating populations of variants of that software without knowledge of the seeded bugs, and then evaluating the degree to which software
variants repair seeded bugs. The following steps were followed.
1. We manually seed each benchmark program in Table 4.1 with five bugs. These
programs are selected to be characteristic of large real-world software projects.
1 Although

these variants are neutral to the original program with respect to the regression test suite, many neutral variants are computationally diverse from the original program
(Section 3.3.2.3) and would not remain neutral under different test suites (in this case one
which tests for the previously unknown bug).
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The seeded bugs are drawn at random from an established defect distribution [55] and fault taxonomy [85], to ensure that our results generalize to the
types of bugs found in real-world software.
2. For each defect, we manually write a test capable of detecting its presence in
the program. These held out tests are withheld until step 4.
3. For each program, using the Cil-AST program representation we generate 5000
neutral variants using only the program regression test suite and not using the
held out tests. These regression test suites are distributed with the programs,
and are the test suites used by the software’s developers themselves. As in
Section 3.3.1.3 these test suites vary in quality and size. We apply mutations
(defined in Section 3.1) uniformly at random and retain the resulting population
of neutral variants.
4. Using the held out tests, we evaluate the populations of neutral variants noting
how many variants pass each of the held out tests.

4.2

Results

Table 4.1 shows the results of this experiment. We find that in most (9 of 11)
programs with five seeded bugs and 5000 neutral variants at least one neutral variant
proactively repaired one of the bugs. When a bug repair was found in the neutral
network we call this bug “repairable”, multiple repairs were usually found with 17.25
proactive repairs found per repairable bug on average.
The types of bugs most commonly repaired were those that resemble the mutation
operations. For example, we found multiple repairs for bugs that could be addressed
by deleting problematic statements or clauses, or inserted clauses or statements to
test for extra conditions. However, there was significant overlap between the types
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Program
Total Bugs Fixed of 5 Bug Fixes Fixes per Bug
bzip
2
63
31.5
imagemagick
2
8
4.0
jansson
2
40
20.0
leukocyte
1
1
1.0
lighttpd
1
73
73.0
nullhttpd
1
7
7.0
oggenc
0
0
0.0
potion
2
14
7.0
redis
0
0
0.0
tiff
0
0
0.0
vyquon
1
1
1.0
Average
1.09
18.82
17.3
Total
12
207
17.2
Table 4.1: Proactive repairs of seeded defects found in a population of 5000 neutral
variants.

of bugs which were and were not repaired. We are not yet able to identify features
which distinguish repairable and non-repairable bugs.
Through manual analysis of those variants that proactively repaired bugs, we
found examples where the variant directly reverted the seeded bug by changing the
same line of code in which the bug was seeded (3% of all repairs) or made a change
within 5 lines of code on either side of the seeded bug (12% of all repairs). However, the majority of repairs (88%) were compensatory (compensatory mutations
repair deleterious effects of changes in one gene by mutating a different gene, and
are thought to be related to evolvability [131]) repairing the bug through changes
elsewhere in the program.
These experiments included only five latent bugs per program. Most deployed
programs have many more than five outstanding defects (e.g., 18,165 from October
2001 to August 2005 for Eclipse (V3.0) and 2,013 from May 2003 to August 2005 for
Firefox (V1.0) [7]).
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Figure 4.1: Number of proactive repairs in a population of 5000 neutral variants for
the potion program as a function of the number of bugs seeded.

Figure 4.1 shows the number of distinct bugs repaired by 5000 neutral variants as
a function of the number of defects seeded. The correlation between the number of
proactive repairs found and the number of seeded bugs is 95%. If our results generalize and this correlation applied to the Eclipse and Firefox projects a population of
5000 neutral variants would repair 9000 and 1000 of the latent later-reported defects
respectively, or in the case of Eclipse almost two bugs per neutral variant.

4.3

Discussion

This use of mutational robustness is analogous to software mutation testing, with
the critical differences that (1) neutral mutants are retained rather than manually
examined; (2) the test suite is not augmented to kill all mutants; and (3) the set
of mutation operators considered is different. The commercial practice of mutation
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testing has been limited by the significant effort required to analyze mutants that pass
the test suite. Such mutants must be manually classified, either as fully equivalent
to the original program or non-equivalent, and the latter further classified as buggy
or as superior to the original program (cf. human oracle problem [162]).
The methodology proposed in this section could provide an alternative to the traditional mutation testing practice, amortizing these labor-intensive steps by retaining
a population of all such neutral variants. When a bug is encountered in the original
program, it will be detected by running all variants against the bug and checking if
some members of the population behave anomalously with respect to the result of the
population. Then the non-failing variations need only then be analyzed to suggest
a repair. This approach of deferring analysis until a potentially beneficial variation
is found may be more feasible than traditional mutation testing, because it does not
require exhaustive manual review of large numbers of program variants. Section 3.6.2
further discusses the relationship between this work and mutation testing.
Additional applications of the implementation diversity attained through neutral
exploration could include running multiple neutral variants of a program simultaneously and automatically detecting differences in behavior (as in [71]), or deploying
autonomous vehicles such as space vehicles with multiple neutral versions of critical
software components providing fallback options in case of software failure. Techniques for reducing the size of neutral populations while maximizing the retained
mutual diversity are explored in prior work [144].
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Chapter 5
Application: Assembler- and
Binary-Level Program Repair

Previous work on automated evolutionary program repair at the level of Cil ASTs
demonstrated a wide range of applicability, for example, repairing 55 of 105 bugs in
a large systematic study [95]. Lower level program representations such as the ASM
and ELF levels (Section 3.1) offer a number of desirable features including generality to other languages than C, reduced source-code requirements (Section 3.1.3),
faster expression times (Section 3.2.1) and greater coverage of the space of possible
programs (Section 3.5).
Chapter 3 showed that the ASM and AST levels of representations have comparable mutational robustness. This chapter builds on that result to investigate both
ASM and ELF level representations in terms of their ability to repair bugs (Section 5.3) and efficiency (Section 5.4). Performing program repair at these lower levels
requires a new form of fault localization (Section 5.1), as the instrumentation-based
method of AST fault localization [96] provides neither the granularity or efficiency
necessary for these lower-level representations.
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This work appeared in ASE 2010 [143] and ASPLOS 2013 [141].

5.1

Fault Localization

Fault localization is the process of determining the location of program faults [45].
The prior work with the AST program representation relied on fault localization to
focus mutation operations to those portions of the program most likely related to
the defect to be repaired. The fault localization process used synthesized traces of
program execution on both good and bad input data to estimate the likelihood that
each execution portion of the program was related to the fault [77].
These techniques required AST statement level program instrumentation. Analogous instrumentation solutions are problematic for lower level program representations, which may have no access to program source. Additionally. many existing
code profilers (e.g., gcov) are source language specific making them unsuitable for
application to ASM program representations.
We develop two methods of profiling, which are applicable to arbitrary assembler and ELF programs; a heavy-weight deterministic runtime harness and a lighter
weight stochastic sampling technique. We compare the quality of results for the
two techniques, finding them to be comparable, and conclude that the sampling
technique is generally preferable. In both cases values of the program counter are
collected which are easily converted into offsets in the vector program representation.
Finally, stochastic samples are smoothed using a Gaussian convolution to improve
their approximation of a full deterministic trace. The smoothing process is shown in
Figure 5.1.
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movq
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8(%rdx), %rdi
%eax, %eax
%eax, (%r15)
$1, %r14d
atoi
-80(%rbp), %rdx
%rdx, -80(%rbp)
$4, %r15
8(%rdx), %rdi
%eax, %eax
%eax, (%r15)

Machine-code
Instructions

Figure 5.1: ASM and ELF level fault localization showing raw and smoothed samples
from the merge-cpp benchmark shown in Table 5.1.

The deterministic sampling technique uses a simple ptrace-based runtime harness, which collects every value obtained by the program counter during execution.1
The simplicity of this technique makes it preferable for short-running programs.
In most cases however, a lighter weight method is preferable. Stochastic sampling uses the oprofile2 [100] system-wide profiler for Linux systems to sample
the value of the program counter during execution (configuration settings including
sampling frequency were left at their default values). Oprofile returns a count of the
total number of times each instruction in the program was sampled. Sampling only
approximates control flow and is vulnerable to gaps and over-sampling of certain
instructions (e.g., those inside of loops), in addition, the fine granularity of samples
often under-estimates the total number of executed instructions by sampling single
instructions in long runs of contiguous executed instructions.
To compensate for these issues, we apply a 1-D Gaussian convolution (Equation 5.1) to the sampled addresses with a radius of 3 assembler instructions. The
resulting smoothed address of each instruction x is then a weighted sum G(x) of its
raw sample count and it’s 3 neighbors (x + i) on either side.
1 https://github.com/eschulte/tracer
2 http://oprofile.sourceforge.net/news
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of stochastic sampling (shown in red) and deterministic fault
localization (shown in blue).

G(x) =

3
X

1 2
1
F (x + i) × √ e− 2 i
2π
i=−3

(5.1)

Gaussian convolution is commonly used to smooth data in fields such as computer
vision [148]. However to our knowledge it had not previously been used for fault
localization. Figure 5.2 compares stochastic and deterministic fault localization for
two programs, deroff and merge sort. In both cases the light weight stochastic
samples have a high fidelity to the full deterministic samples. Merge sort provides
an example of a program with high fault localization coverage, and deroff provides
an example of a program with low fault localization coverage.
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Program
atris
ccrypt
deroff
flex
indent
look-s
look-u
merge
merge-cpp
s3
uniq
units
zune
total

Program Size
C
ASM
ELF
LOC
LOC
Bytes
9578
39153 131756
4249
15261
18716
1467
6330
17692
8779
37119
73452
5952
15462
49384
205
516
1628
205
541
1784
72
219
1384
71
421
1540
594
767
1804
143
421
1288
496
1364
3196
51
108
664
31862 117682 304288

Program Description
graphical tetris game
encryption utility
document processing
lexical analyzer generator
source code processing
dictionary lookup
dictionary lookup
merge sort
merge sort (in C++)
sendmail utility
duplicate text processing
metric conversion
embedded media player
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Defect
buffer exploit
segfault
segfault
segfault
infinite loop
infinite loop
infinite loop
improper sorting
improper sorting
buffer overflow
segfault
segfault
infinite loop

Table 5.1: Benchmarks used in program repair experiments using the ASM and
ELF level program representations. Each program includes one bug described in the
“Defect” column. The “Program Size” columns give the size of the programs in lines
of code “LOC” for AST and ASM representations and in bytes of program data for
the ELF representation.

5.2

Benchmarks

To evaluate the effectiveness of repair at the ASM and ELF levels, a number of
benchmark programs used in previous work at the Cil-AST level were selected. The
success rates and search metrics were collected and compared to earlier work.
The suite of benchmark programs is shown in Table 5.1 together with the size at
different representation levels, a brief program description, and a defect description.
The selected programs cover a wide range of both bugs and security vulnerabilities.
All programs except for the C++ version of merge sort are taken directly from
previous on program repair at the Cil-AST level [161].
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Program
atris
ccrypt
deroff
flex
indent
look-s
look-u
merge
merge-cpp
s3
uniq
units
zune
average
w/o units

% Success
AST ASM ELF
83
0
5
100
100
100
100
98
100
6
1
0
4
41
0
100
100
100
100
100
100
54
100
84
100
79
100
96
50
100
100
100
91
13
51
100
100
100
78.17 70.75 65.83
77.00 76.00 67.18

79

Expected Fitness Evaluations
AST
ASM
ELF
27.44
†
48806.00
7.00
673.00
25.00
48.00
50.00
454.00
78340.50 496255.00
†
62737.25
13517.48
†
41.00
71.00
3.00
90.00
16.00
19.00
4456.85
621.00
1008.19
†
314.00 2135.2658
4.00
4.00
95.00
8.00
46.00
8.00
930.23
57374.63
8538.47
17.00
26.00
45.00
622.45
6542.40
1132.85
583.98
188.38
207.15

Table 5.2: Evaluation of the effectiveness of ASM and ELF level representations.
“% Success” gives the percentage of random seeds for which a valid repair is found
within 5000 runs of the full test suite. “Expected Fitness Evaluations” counts the
expected number of evaluations per repair (Equation 5.2). † Indicates that there
were no successful repairs in 5000 fitness evaluations. Rows with † were excluded
when calculating average “Expected Fitness Evaluations”.

5.3

Effectiveness

Table 5.2 compares the ability of the ASM and ELF level representations to repair
defects that were also repaired in previous work at the Cil-AST level (Weimer et
al. [161]). Due to the smaller scale of the program transformations performed at ELF
and ASM levels (Section 3.1.2), we expected the repair process at these levels to be
both slower and less successful. We were surprised to find comparable overall success
rates between the ASM and ELF level repairs (70.75% and 65.83% respectively)
and the AST level 78.18%. Using the Fisher’s Exact test to compare success rates
between Cil-AST and the lower levels we find no significant difference, with p-values
of 1 between AST and ASM, and 0.294 between AST and ELF.
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The “Expected Fitness Evaluations” column reports the expected number of fitness evaluations per repair (including failed repair attempts). The calculation of
expected fitness evaluations is given in Equation 5.2.

expected = f its + (runs − 1) × f itf where

(5.2)

f its = average evaluations per successful run
f itf = average evaluations per failed run
runs = average runs per success

More surprising was the reduced number of fitness evaluations required to find
a repair at these lower levels shown in the “w/o units” average (which removes the
outlier “units” program) of the expected fitness evaluations for each representation.
The ASM and ELF level repairs required 188.38 and 207.15 fitness evaluations on
average respectively as compared to 583.98 fitness evaluations on average for CilAST level repairs. These results suggest that even though mutations at these lower
levels affect smaller portions of the program, the repairs at these levels are located
more closely (in terms of mutation) or more densely around the original program.
To provide intuition for this statement, consider the repair for the simple merge sort
bug which incorrectly sorts some inputs. A valid repair is to swap the then and else
branches of the following if statement.
if ( left [l - mid -1] <= right [0]) { /* fix : swap branches */
result = list ;
} else {
result = merge ( left ,l - mid , right , mid );
}
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At the Cil-AST level this repair is only accomplished by 2 of 4900 possible swap
mutation operations.3 At the lower levels this repair is accomplished by simply
deleting the cmpl instruction in the following assembler code.
cmp % eax , % edx ; ; fix : delete instruction
jg

.L12

mov -72(% rbp ) , % rax

This is 1 of only 280 possible delete mutation operations,4 and is much more easily
found.

5.4

Efficiency

Having found comparable effectiveness across all levels, we next consider the efficiency of the repair process by level of representation. This includes both static
properties such as the size of the installed toolchain required to perform repair (Section 3.2.1), as well as runtime properties such as the time required to perform repair.
In general the ASM and ELF representations perform automated program repair
more efficiently than the higher Cil-AST level as shown in Table 5.3.
Runtime The runtime of the automated repair process is dominated by the time
taken to perform fitness evaluations (Section 3.2). The time taken for a fitness evaluation includes both the time required to run the test suite, and the
time required to express the program as an executable (i.e., compile and link),
the lower level representations are expressed much more efficiently because they
don’t need to be compiled (ASM) or compiled and linked (ELF) (Section 3.2.1).
This effect is compounded by the fact that fewer expected total fitness evaluations were required at the lower levels as shown in the previous section. As
3 Merge

sort has 70 total Cil-AST statements. Each swap selects two statements for a
total of 70 × 70 = 4900 possible swap operations.
4 Merge sort has 280 total ASM instructions. Each deletion selects one instruction for a
total of 280 possible deletion operations.
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Program
atris
ccrypt
deroff
flex
indent
look-s
look-u
merge
merge-cpp
s3
uniq
units
zune
average
w/o units

Memory (MB)
AST
ASM
ELF
2384∗ 2384∗
496
∗
∗
6437
3338
334
1907∗
811
453
691
381
162
∗
∗
3242
1669
572
420
62
29
430
52
62
152
45
57
†
50
60
152
76
43
358
72
72
572
162
95
76
17
29
1401.75 755.75 200.33
1242
559
135

Runtime (s)
AST
ASM
22.87
†
39.15
342.23
37.33
1366.61
1948.84
1125.44
3301.88
3852.47
747.59
353.81
12.68
6.38
842.74
100.93
†
121.87
14.43
23.46
105.18
3.46
1075.16 18778.70
36.93
28.79
323.47
2333.82
229.50
278.20
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ELF
385.63
21.58
292.88
†
†
6.00
3.66
161.35
90.56
28.02
7.18
501.54
71.49
121.52
74.02

Table 5.3: Evaluation of defect repair efficiency at the ASM and ELF level representations. “Memory” reports the average max memory required for a repair (as
reported by the Unix top utility). “Runtime” reports the average time per successful
repair in seconds. † Indicates that there were no successful repairs in 5000 fitness
evaluations. Rows with † are excluded when calculating “Memory,” “Runtime,” and
“Expected Fitness Evaluations” averages.

a result the runtime for repair is significantly reduced for the lower levels of
program representation.
Despite the reduced number of fitness evaluations and reduced expression time,
ASM level repairs take longer on average than AST level repairs. This might
be due to an increased likelihood of transformations at the ASM resulting in
ASM
ELF
Runtime -21.2% 67.7%
Disk
47.4% 95.2%
Memory 55.0% 89.1%
Table 5.4: Decrease in resource requirements at the ASM and ELF level representations compared to the {\sc Cil}-AST level representation. “Runtime” and
“Memory” numbers exclude units as an outlier.
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new bugs, such as infinite loops, which increase the running time of the test
suite.
Disk usage The disk usage during repairs differs dramatically between levels of
representation, as expected. The reduced disk footprint of the ASM and ELF
levels is primarily due to the fact that these lower-level representations do not
need a compiler, or a compiler and linker respectively, to express programs as
executables.
Memory The working memory of the repair process is dominated by the space
required to hold the population of candidate repairs variants. This space is
dictated by the size of individual program representations in memory. The
ASM and ELF level program representations are more space-efficient. Instead
of storing a tree of source-code statements as in the AST level, the lower levels
store a vector of text assembly instructions at the ASM level and a vectors of
byte-sequences at the ELF level.

5.5

Discussion

This chapter described experiments of the ability of the ASM and ELF level program representations to repair bugs taken from previous program repair work at the
Cil-AST level. To efficiently perform program repair over these lower level representations changes to the program repair process were required, including a lighter
weight stochastic method of fault localization (Section 5.1).
Program repair at these lower levels was found to be as effective as program
repair at the Cil-AST level (Section 5.3) and more efficient in terms of memory
consumption, disk footprint and runtime (Section 5.4).
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Chapter 6
Application: Patching Closed Source
Executables
The ability to manipulate ELF files directly obviates the need for any access to software development resources such as source code or build toolchains. This suggests
the possibility of modifying proprietary closed-source applications. An interesting
use case, for example, is repairing security vulnerabilities in closed-source executables. However, this use case raises new challenges, such as how to conduct automated
program repair without access to a regression test suite. We demonstrate this application by repairing multiple security vulnerabilities in the NETGEAR WNDR3700
wireless router.1
Router bugs are a significant issue, ranging from the bug in CISCO’s IOS, which
on February 16th 2009 caused outages in nearly every country worldwide [167], to
security vulnerabilities in home routers like NEGEAR [35] or the recent D-Link
bug [49]. Security bugs are particularly problematic, especially because major software vendors commonly delay releasing patches to security exploits. In a study of
1 http://www.netgear.com/home/products/networking/wifi-routers/wndr3700.

aspx
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high- and medium-risk vulnerabilities in Microsoft and Apple products between 2002
and 2008, for example, about 10% of vulnerabilities were found not to be patched
within 150 days of disclosure, and on any given date about 10 vulnerabilities and
over 20 vulnerabilities were public and un-patched for Microsoft and Apple respectively [54].
In recent years, a variety of automated methods for program repair have successfully repaired defects in real software (see Section 2.4). The ELF program representation introduced in Chapter 3 allows for the transformation and evaluation of
binary executables without the need for any access to developer resources such as
source code, or built toolchains. In Chapter 5 we described automated repair methods based on evolutionary computation to repair defects directly in x86 and ARM
ELF files. Chapter 5, however, relies on a regression test suite to define the required
functionality of the program under repair. Here we consider a setting in which neither source code nor test suites are available, and there is no special information or
cooperation from the vendor.
Software vendors are often slow to respond to security vulnerabilities after exploits
have been discovered. This leads to a dire situation for end users who lack product
source code and must wait for a patch to be released by the vendor. Rather than
waiting for vendor-delivered patches, we present an alternative approach in which
newly discovered exploits drive an automated repair technique capable of patching
vulnerabilities, even without access to source code or special information from the
software vendor. A user-produced patch could be installed temporarily for internal
protection, redistributed with the exploit (reporting an exploit with a patch in hand
has been shown to reduce the total number of attacks [8]), or sent to the software
vendor to reduce development time for the official patch [159].
This Chapter describes how the Genprog repair method can be applied to this
new use case. Extensions to earlier work include: Repairing security vulnerabilities
in router binaries; special processing to handle stripped ELF files; operating without
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fault localization information; operating without a pre-existing regression test suite
to define required program behavior; and the discovery of multiple iterative repairs
in a binary.
We demonstrate the method by repairing two recently discovered exploits in
version 4 of NETGEAR’s WNDR3700 wireless router before NETGEAR released
patches publicly for the exploits (at the time of writing NETGEAR has not publicly
addressed the exploits). Without the use of any regression tests to guide the search,
we find that 80% of the automatically generated repairs for the example vulnerabilities retain program functionality. When user-created tests of required functionality
are incorporated in an interactive process, success quickly increases to 100% of the
proposed repairs.
To encourage reproducibility and to allow others to patch future vulnerabilities,
we provide a companion source repository2 for this Chapter. It contains the instructions, source code, and tooling needed to extract, execute and repair the binary
NETGEAR router image vulnerabilities, and to regenerate the analyses, tables, and
figures included in this chapter.
The remainder of the chapter reviews two recent exploits of NETGEAR
WNDR3700 (Section 6.1); demonstrates the feasibility of running the NETGEAR
firmware in a VM sandbox (Section 6.2.1); describes the automated program repair
technique (Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3); evaluates effectiveness and quality of repairs
(Section 6.3); and discusses implications and limitations (Section 6.4).
This work is previously unpublished.

2 https://github.com/eschulte/netgear-repair
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Description of Exploits

We describe two current exploits in version 4 of the NETGEAR WNDR3700 wireless
router. The popularity of this router implies that vulnerable systems are currently
widespread. For example, the “shodan"3 device search engine returned hundreds of
vulnerable publicly accessible WNDR3700 routers at the time of writing. Both exploits exist in the router’s internal web server in a binary executable named net-cgi,
and both are related to how net-cgi handles authentication [35].
The vendor-deployed binary is insecure in at least two ways:
1. Any URL starting with the string “BRS” bypasses authentication.
2. Any URL including the substring “unauth.cgi” or “securityquestions.cgi”
bypasses authentication. This applies even to requests of the form http:
//router/page.html?foo=unauth.cgi, meaning that the vulnerability effectively applies to all internal webpages.
Many administrative pages start with the “BRS” string, providing attackers with
access to personal information such as users passwords, and by accessing the page
http://router/BRS_02_genieHelp.html attackers can disable authentication completely and permanently across reboots.

6.2

Automated Repair Method

Our repair technique for this vulnerability consists of three stages:
1. Extract the binary executable from the firmware and reproduce the exploit
(Section 6.2.1).
3 http://www.shodanhq.com/search?q=wndr3700v4+http
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2. Use evolutionary techniques to search for repairs by applying random mutations
(and crossover) to the stripped (without symbols or section tables) MIPS ELF
binary (Section 6.2.2).
3. Construct test cases lazily, as needed, to improve the quality of unsatisfactory
candidate repairs (Section 6.2.3).
The first step in repairing the net-cgi executable is to extract it and the router
file system from the firmware image distributed by NETGEAR. Using the extracted
file system and executable we construct a test harness that can exercise the vulnerabilities in net-cgi. This test harness is used by the repair algorithm to evaluate
candidate repairs and to identify when repairs for the vulnerabilities have been found.

6.2.1

Firmware Extraction and Virtualization

NETGEAR distributes firmware with a full system image for the WNDR3700 router,
which includes the router file system that has the vulnerable net-cgi executable.
We extracted the file system using the binwalk4 firmware extraction tool, which
scans the binary data in the raw monolithic firmware file, searching for signatures
identifying embedded data sections, including squashfs [103] that hold the router’s
file system.
The router runs on a big-endian MIPS architecture, requiring emulation on most
desktop systems to safely reproduce the exploit and evaluate candidate repairs.
We used the QEMU system emulator [15] to emulate the MIPS architecture in a
lightweight manner with Debian Linux also run in emulation. The extracted router
file system is copied into the emulated MIPS Linux system. A number of special
directories (e.g., /proc/, /dev/) are mounted inside the extracted file system and
bound to the corresponding directories on the virtual machine. At this point, com4 http://binwalk.org
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mands can be executed in an environment that closely approximates the execution
environment of the NETGEAR router by using the chroot command to confine executable access to within the extracted NETGEAR file system. Additional minor
adjustments are described in the reproduction documentation.5
At this point the NETGEAR router can be run under virtualization. In particular, the router’s web interface can be accessed either using an external web browser
or the net-cgi executable can be called directly from the command line.

6.2.2

Automated Program Repair and ELF Files

The repair algorithm constructs a population of 512 program variants, each with
one or more random mutations (Chapter 3). This population is evolved through an
iterated process of evaluation, selection, mutation, and crossover until a version of
the original program is found that repairs the bug. “Repair” in this context is defined
to mean that it avoids the buggy behavior and does not break required functionality.
In Chapter 5, execution traces were collected during program execution and used
as a form of fault localization to bias random mutations towards the parts of the
program most likely to contain the bug. Our decision not to use fault localization is
explained in Section 6.3.2.2.
The basic Genprog repair algorithm was modified in several ways to address the
unique scenario of a user repairing a faulty binary executable, without access to a
regression test suite (Section 6.2.3), and without the fault localization optimization.

6.2.2.1

Challenge: Mutating Stripped Binaries

Executable programs for Unix and embedded system are commonly distributed as
ELF [32] files. Each ELF file contains a number of headers and tables containing
5 http://eschulte.github.io/netgear-repair/INSTRUCTIONS.html
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ELF Header
Linker

Section Table
...
Section Data
...
Program Table

Memory

Figure 6.1: Sections and their uses in an ELF file.

administrative data, and sections holding program code and data. The three main
administrative elements of an ELF file are the ELF header, the section table and the
program table (see Figure 6.1). The ELF header points to the section table and the
program table, the section table holds information on the layout of sections in the
ELF file on disk, and the program table holds information on how to copy sections
from disk into memory for program execution.
Although the majority of ELF files include all three of the elements shown in
Figure 6.1, only the ELF Header is guaranteed to exist in all cases. In executable
ELF files, the program table is also required, and similarly, in linkable files the section
table is required.
We extend Chapter 5, which repaired unstripped Intel and ARM files [141]. In
that work the .text section of the ELF file was modified by the mutation and
crossover operations, but in this case net-cgi does not include key information
on which the earlier work relied, namely the section table and section name string
table. This information was used to locate the .text section of the ELF file where
program code is normally stored. The data in the .text section were then coerced
into a vector of assembly instructions (the genome) on which the mutation operations
were defined. Our extension removes this dependence by concatenating the data of
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Swap

0x0

One Point Crossover

Figure 6.2: Mutation and Crossover operations for stripped MIPS ELF files. The
program data are represented as a fixed length array of single-word sections. These
operators change these sections maintaining length and offset in the array.

every section in the program table that has a “loadable” type to produce the genome.
These are the sections whose data are loaded into memory during program execution.

Mutation operations must change program data without corrupting the structure
of the file or breaking the many addresses hard coded into the program data itself
(e.g., as destinations for conditional jumps). In general, it is impossible to distinguish
between an integer literal and an address in program data, so the mutation operations
are designed to preserve operand absolute sizes and offsets within the ELF program
data. This requirement is easily met because every argumented assembly instruction
in the MIPS RISC architecture is one word long [61]. “Single point crossover” is used
to recombine two ELF files. An offset in the program data is selected, then bytes
from one file are taken up to that offset and bytes from the other file taken after
that offset. This form of crossover works especially well because all ELF files will
have similar total length and offsets. The mutation and crossover operations used to
modify stripped MIPS ELF files are shown in Figure 6.2.
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On-Demand Regression Testing

Our approach to program repair relies on the ability to assess the validity of program
variants. The mutations are random in the sense that they do not take into account
or preserve the semantics of the program. They are more likely to create new bugs or
vulnerabilities than they are to repair undesired behavior, and the method requires
an evaluation scheme to distinguish between these cases.
Instead of relying on a pre-existing regression test suite, we assume only that a
demonstration of the exploit provides a single available failing test. By mutating
programs without the safety net of a regression test suite, the evolved “repairs” often
introduce significant regressions. However, by applying a strict minimization process
after the primary repair is identified, these regressions are usually removed (as in
the Genprog technique described in Section 2.4). The minimization reduces the
difference between the evolved repair and the original program to as few edits as
possible using delta debugging6 . The interactive phase of the repair algorithm asks
the user to identify any regressions that remain after the delta debugging step. In
the case of the NETGEAR router bug, repaired versions of the net-cgi executable
web-server are run in simulation and a user uses a web browser to manually use the
web server. High-level pseudocode for the repair algorithm is show in Figure 6.3.
Our method is thus an interactive repair process in which the algorithm searches
for a patch that passes every available test (starting with only the exploit), and then
minimizes it using delta debugging. In a third step, the user evaluates its suitability.
If the repair is accepted, the process terminates. Otherwise, the user supplies a new
regression test that the repair fails (a witness to its unsuitability) and the process
repeats. In Section 6.3 we find that 80% of our attempts to repair the NETGEAR
WNDR3700 exploits did not require any user-written regression tests.
6 https://github.com/eschulte/delta-debug
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Input: Vulnerable Program, original : ELF
Input: Exploit Tests, exploits : [ELF → F itness]
Input: Interactive Check, goodEnough : ELF → [ELF → F itness]
Output: Patched version of Program
1: let new ← null
2: let f itness ← null
3: let suite ← exploits
4: repeat
5:
let full ← evolSubroutine(original, suite)
6:
new ← minimize()
7:
let newRegressionT ests ← goodEnough(new)
8:
suite ← suite + +newRegressionTests
9: until length(newRegressionTests)(−1cm : 1.5cm)circle(1cm)0
10: return new

Figure 6.3: High-level Pseudocode for interactive lazy-regression-testing repair algorithm.

The evolSubroutine in Figure 6.3 is organized similarly to previous work [96],
but it uses a steady state evolutionary algorithm (Section 2.2.2). Figure 6.4 gives the
high-level pseudocode.
Note that every time the user rejects the solution returned by evolSubroutine,
the evolved and minimized solution is discarded and a new population is generated
by recopying the original in evolSubroutine.

6.3

Repairing the NETGEAR Exploits

We first describe the experimental setup used to test the repair technique on the
NETGEAR WNDR3700 vulnerability (Section 6.3.1). We then analyze the results
of ten repair attempts (Section 6.3.2).
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Input: Vulnerable Program, original : ELF
Input: Test Suite, suite : [ELF → F itness]
Parameters: populationSize, tournamentSize, crossRate
Output: Patched version of Program
1: let f itness ← evaluate(original, suite)
2: let pop ← populationSize copies of horiginal, fitnessi
3: repeat
4:
if Random() < CrossRate then
5:
let p1 ← crossover(tournament(pop, tounamentSize, +))
6:
let p2 ← crossover(tournament(pop, tounamentSize, +))
7:
let p ← crossover(p1 , p2 )
8:
else
9:
p ← tournament(pop, tounamentSize, +)
10:
end if
11:
let p0 ← Mutate(p)
12:
let f itness ← evaluate(suite, p0 )
13:
incorporate(pop, hp0 , Fitness(Run(p0 ))i)
14:
if length(pop) > maxPopulationSize then
15:
evict(pop, tournament(pop, tounamentSize, −))
16:
end if
17: until fitness > length(suite)
18: return p0

Figure 6.4: High-level Pseudocode for the steady state parallel evolutionary repair
subroutine.

6.3.1

Methodology

All repairs were performed on a server-class machine with 32 physical Intel Xeon
2.60GHz cores, Hyper-Threading and 120 GB of Memory. We used a test harness to
assess the fitness of each program variant (Section 3.2) and report parameters used
in the experiments (Section 6.3.1.2). An overview of the experimental configuration
is provided in Figure 6.5.

6.3.1.1

Fitness Evaluation

We used 32 QEMU virtual machines, each running Debian Linux with the NETGEAR router firmware environment available inside of a chroot. The repair algo-
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Figure 6.5: A high level view of the tooling used to repair a closed source router bug.

rithm uses 32 threads for parallel fitness evaluation. Each thread is paired with a
single QEMU VM on which it tests fitness.
The test framework includes both a host and a guest test script. The host script
runs on the server performing repair and the guest script runs in a MIPS virtual
machine. The host script copies a variant of the net-cgi executable to the guest
VM where the guest test script executes net-cgi the command line and reports a
result of Pass, Fail, or Error for each test. These values are then used to calculate
the variant’s scalar fitness as shown in Equation 6.1.




2 if PASS

X 
f itness =
1 if FAIL
t∈Test Suite 


0 if ERROR

(6.1)

Pass indicates that the program completed successfully and produced the correct
result, Fail indicates that the program completed successfully but produced an
incorrect result, and Error indicates that the program execution did not complete
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successfully due to early termination (e.g., because of a segfault) or by a non-zero
ERRNO exit value.

6.3.1.2

Repair Parameters

Repair uses the following parameters. The maximum population size is 29 individuals, selection is performed using a tournament size of two.7 When the population
overflows the maximum population size, an individual is selected for eviction using a
“negative” tournament in which the lowest fitness individual is selected for eviction.
Newly generated individuals undergo crossover two-thirds of the time.
These parameters differ significantly from those used in previous evolutionary
repair algorithms (e.g., [50, 95, 97]). Specifically, we use larger populations (512
instead of 40 individuals), running for many more fitness evaluations (≤100,000 instead of ≤400). However, the parameters used here are in line with those used in
other evolutionary program repair publications given the size of the net-cgi binary,
and they help compensate for the lack of fault localization information.
The increased memory required by the larger population size is offset by the use
of a steady state evolutionary algorithm (Section 2.2.2), and the increased computational demand of the greater number of fitness evaluations is offset by parallelization
of fitness evaluation.

7 When

the fitness of all variants in the population has been evaluated, the fitness values
are used to select one individual for subsequent modifications in the next generation. We use
tournament selection where each tournament chooses a subset of two (the tournament size)
randomly from the population and the individual with higher fitness wins the tournament
and is copied into the population.
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Experimental Results

We report results for the time typically taken to generate a repair (Section 6.3.2.1),
the effect of eliminating fault localization (Section 6.3.2.2), and the impact of the
minimization process (Section 6.3.2.3), both with respect to the size of the repair in
terms of byte difference from the original and in terms of the fitness improvement.

6.3.2.1

Repair Runtime

In 8 of the 10 runs of the algorithm (with random restarts), the three exploit tests
alone were sufficient to generate a satisfactory repair (determined using a withheld
regression test suite hand-written by the authors8 ), and the third phase of usergenerated tests was not required.
In these cases the repair process took an average of ~36,000 total fitness evaluations requiring on average 86.6 minutes to find a repair using 32 virtual machines
for parallelized fitness evaluation.

6.3.2.2

Repair without Fault Localization

In the NETGEAR scenario we do not use any form of fault localization. While
this might reduce the efficiency of repair, it is a benefit in cases where the use of
fault localization would over-constrain the search operators. The limitation, as in
Genprog, of program transformations to only those portions of a program exercised
by the failing program inputs prevents valid repairs from being found if they require
modification to statements outside of those executed by the failing input (in e.g.,
type definitions, global variables, or data sections in an ELF file).
8 https://github.com/eschulte/netgear-repair/blob/master/bin/test-cgi
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Figure 6.6: Fixes occur in different locations from execution traces: The location
of every edit in a minimized successful repair is plotted as a horizontal line. Each
vertical column shows points of execution traces from one test suite. Test suites
shown from left to right are 3 tests (exploit tests only), 4, 7, and 11 tests (exploit and
author-generated regression tests), with 330, 399, 518, and 596 sampled execution
locations respectively. Code modifications occur in different locations from execution
traces

One of the NETGEAR exploits exemplifies this issue. As shown in Figure 6.6,
fault localization might have prevented the repair process from succeeding. The
figure shows that many of the program edit locations for successful repairs were not
visited by the execution trace. In fact, only 2 of the 22 program locations modified
by successful repairs were within 3 instructions of the execution traces. Although
surprising, this result suggests that earlier work, which confines edit operations to
execution traces, would likely be unable to repair the NETGEAR bugs.

6.3.2.3

The impact of Minimization

In some cases the initial suggested repair, known as the primary repair, was not satisfactory. For example, suggested repairs sometimes worked when net-cgi was called
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directly on the command line but not through the embedded uHTTPd webserver,9
or the repaired file failed to serve pages not used in the exploit test. However, Table 6.1 shows that in most cases the minimized version of the repair was satisfactory,
successfully passing all hand-written regression tests, even those not used during the
repair process.
Run Fit Evals Full Diff Min Diff
0
90405
500
2
1
17231
134
3
2
26879
205
2
3
23764
199
2
4
47906
319
2
5
13102
95
2
6
76960
556
3
7
11831
79
3
8
2846
10
1
9
25600
182
2
mean
33652.4
227.9
2.2

Full Fit Min Fit
8
22
22
22
21
22
19
22
6
6
16
22
17
22
20
22
14
14
21
22
16.4
19.6

Table 6.1: The evolved repair before and after minimization. In these columns “Full”
refers to evolved solutions before minimization and “Min” refers to solutions after.
Columns labeled “Diff” report the number of diff hunks against the original program
data. The columns labeled “Fit” report fitness as measured with a full regression test
suite, including the exploit tests. The maximum possible fitness score is 22 (using
the fitness function in Equation 6.1 with all 11 tests), indicating a successful repair.

As shown in Table 6.1, the initial evolved repair differed from the original at over
200 locations10 on average in the ELF program data, while the minimized repairs
differed at only 1–3 locations on average. This great discrepancy is due to the
accumulation of candidate edits in non-tested portions of the program data. Since
these portions of the program were not tested, there was no evolutionary pressure to
purge the harmful edits. Delta debugging eliminates these edits.
9 http://wiki.openwrt.org/doc/uci/uhttpd
10 The

number of difference locations are counted as the number of unified diff hunks
calculated using the diff command with the -u option.
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Discussion

The results presented here open up the possibility that end users could repair software
vulnerabilities in closed source software without special information or aid from the
software vendor. We hope that the tooling published with this work,11 encourages
users to patch important vulnerabilities quickly and researchers to release patches
simultaneously with exploit announcements.
There are several caveats associated with this initial work. First, we demonstrated
repair on a single executable, and it is possible that the success in the absence of
regression test suite will not generalize. However, our results do not appear to be
based on any property unique to the NETGEAR exploits. We conjecture that our
success at finding functional repairs in this setting is due to the beneficial impact of
minimization and to software mutational robustnesss (Section 3.3). Although we did
not test our repairs on physical NETGEAR WNDR3700 hardware, we are confident
that they would have the same effect on hardware as they do in emulation.
Whenever a patch is distributed there a risk of someone reverse-engineering an
exploit from the patch text [22]. As shown in Table 6.1 our technique sometimes
generates patches that are not directly relevant to the repaired vulnerability. It may
be possible to avoid this risk by generating obfuscated patches in cases where a
regression test suite is available and minimization is not performed.

11 https://github.com/eschulte/netgear-repair
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Chapter 7
Application: Optimizing
Nonfunctional Program Properties
The applications presented in prior chapters have considered only functional properties of software. This chapter describes an application of evolutionary exploration
of neutral networks to the optimization of nonfunctional software properties, and
find the fitness landscapes defined by these nonfunctional properties to be suitable
for evolutionary guided search (as predicted in Section 3.6.4). We present a general
Genetic Optimization Algorithm (GOA),1 and demonstrate its effectiveness.
Runtime requirements for software are increasingly dominated by complex nonfunctional properties. In some server environments memory footprint and the resultant impact on concurrently running processes is of utmost importance [105], while
in other settings minimizing off-chip communication is paramount. At the extremes
of very small embedded systems and very large data-centers minimizing energy minimization is more important that runtime efficiency [21]. Data-centers are estimated
to have consumed over 1% of the global electricity production in 2010 [88], so techniques for minimizing the energy consumption of software could have immediate
1 https://github.com/eschulte/goa
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global impact. Despite the pressing need, existing compilers do not target energy
consumption. For example a 2010 bug report against the LLVM compiler suite requesting an -OE flag to minimize energy consumption2 was marked as invalid with a
note to use runtime minimization.3
Runtime properties such as energy consumption are often the result of complex
interactions with the particulars of the hardware and environment in which the software is running, limiting the effectiveness of general techniques. Given the wealth of
complex runtime properties of software, the large number of available hardware platforms and configurations, and the impact of innocuous environmental factors such
as environment variables [115], the resulting cross-product of potential optimizations
(each of which may require individual program transformation, implementation or
configuration) far exceeds the resources of compiler developers.
This chapter describes GOA, which is a post-compilation optimization technique
leveraging evolutionary search to automatically find machine-, environment- and
workload-specific optimizations in the space of assembler code programs. The remainder of this chapter introduces GOA (Section 7.1). Its effectiveness is evaluated
by reducing energy consumption for the PARSEC [17] benchmark applications on
two different hardware platforms. GOA finds both hardware- and workload-specific
optimizations, and reduce energy consumption of the PARSEC benchmarks by 20%
on average as compared to the most efficient available compiler optimizations (Section 7.2).
This work appeared in ASPLOS 2014 [142].

2 http://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=6210
3 The

LLVM compiler still does not provide any option for energy minimization.
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Figure 7.1: Overview of the genetic optimization algorithm.

7.1

Genetic Optimization Algorithm

GOA is a post-compilation, workload-driven optimization technique. GOA takes as
input the assembler code produced by an optimizing compiler such as GCC. This input
is parsed into an ASM-level representation (Section 3.1). GOA uses workloads provided by the software developer to exercise candidate optimizations both to evaluate
candidate optimizations both for functionality and to measure runtime properties.
An overview of GOA is given in Figure 7.1.
The ASM-level representation of the original program is extracted from the build
process, assigned a fitness (illustrated in steps 4, 5, 6 of Figure 7.1) and used to seed
a population of program variants. An evolutionary computation algorithm (Section 7.1.2) then searches for candidate program optimizations. Every iteration of
the main search loop: (1) selects a candidate optimization from the population, (2)
transforms it (Section 3.1.2), (3) links the result into an executable (Section 3.2.1),
(4) runs the resulting executable against the supplied workload (as in Section 3.2.2),
(5) collects performance information for programs that correctly process the work-

Chapter 7. Application: Optimizing Nonfunctional Program Properties

104

load, (6) combines the profiling information into a scalar fitness score using the fitness
function, and (7) reinserts the optimization and its fitness score into the population.
The process continues until either a desired optimization target is reached or a predetermined time budget is exceeded. When the algorithm completes, a post-processing
step (8) takes the best individual found in the search and minimizes it with respect
to the original program (as in Section 6.3.2.3). GOA returns an assembler diff which
may be either manually reviewed or applied to the original program to produce an
optimized version of the program.

7.1.1

Inputs

As shown in Figure 7.1, GOA requires three inputs from the developer, the assembly
code of the program to be optimized, a regression test suite that captures required
functionality, and a measurable optimization target.
The program to be optimized is presented as a single assembly file, which can
either be extracted from the build process, e.g., using gcc’s “–combine” flag for C or in
other cases, manual concatenation of multiple .s assembler files may be required. In
practice this was straightforward. Only visible assembler code included in the input
will be available to be optimized, so performance-critical library functions must be
included inline.
The input workload serves as an implicit specification of correct behavior; a candidate optimization that generate the correct result on this input is assumed to
retain all required functionality. Of course there is a risk that optimizations inadequately evaluated by the workload break program behavior, which we address in Section 7.2.2. A post-processing minimization step (implemented as in Section 6.3.2.3)
removes most harmful mutations which are not caught by the test suite.
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Input: Original Program, P : P rogram
Input: Workload, Run : P rogram → ExecutionM etrics
Input: Fitness Function, Fitness : ExecutionM etrics → R
Parameters: P opSize, CrossRate, T ournamentSize, M axEvals
Output: Program that optimizes Fitness
1: let P op ← P opSize copies of hP, Fitness(Run(P ))i
2: let EvalCounter ← 0
3: repeat
4:
let p ← null
5:
if Random() < CrossRate then
6:
let p1 ← Tournament(P op, T ournamentSize, +)
7:
let p2 ← Tournament(P op, T ournamentSize, +)
8:
p ← Crossover(p1 , p2 )
9:
else
10:
p ← Tournament(P op, T ournamentSize, +)
11:
end if
12:
let p0 ← Mutate(p)
13:
AddTo(P op, hp0 , Fitness(Run(p0 ))i)
14:
EvictFrom(P op, Tournament(P op, T ournamentSize, −))
15: until EvalCounter ≥ M axEvals
16: return Minimize(Best(P op))

Figure 7.2: High-level pseudocode for the main loop of GOA.

Finally, the developer must supply a fitness function which GOA will attempt
to optimize (usually minimize). In the current implementation this function must
produce a single scalar fitness value. In our demonstration example the fitness function estimates energy consumption from profile data collected during the execution
of candidate optimizations. However, any function producing a scalar value could
be used, e.g., a valid fitness function could eschew profile data and simply measure
the size of the executable. We view the generality of possible fitness functions as a
strength of this technique.

7.1.2

The GOA Algorithm
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GOA uses a steady state evolutionary algorithm (shown in Figure 7.2). This differs from previous applications of evolutionary computation techniques to real-world
software (e.g., Genprog) which typically use generational genetic algorithms [95, 96].
Instead of replacing the population in discrete steps (generations), steady state evolutionary algorithms operate on single individual candidate optimizations performing
the selection, transformation, evaluation and insertion (steps 1, 2, 4 5 6, and 7 in
Figure 7.1 respectively) on single individuals in turn. The benefits of steady state
genetic algorithms are presented in Section 2.2.2.
High-level pseudocode for the GOA algorithm is given in Figure 7.2.

The

main loop is parallelized across multiple threads. Synchronization between threads
is only required during access to the population P op and the evaluation counter
EvalCounter.

The population is initialized with a number of copies of the original program
(line 1). In every iteration of the main loop (lines 3–15) the search space of possible
optimizations is explored by transforming the program using random mutation and
crossover operations (described in the next subsection). The probability CrossRate
controls the application of the crossover operator (lines 6–8). If a crossover is to be
performed, two high-fitness parents are chosen from the population via tournament
selection [130, Section 2.3] and combined to form one new optimization (line 8).
Otherwise, a single high-fitness optimization is selected. In either case, the candidate
optimization is mutated (line 12), its fitness is calculated (by linking it and running
it on the test suite, see Section 3.2), and it is reinserted into the population (line 13).
The steady state algorithm then selects a member of the population for eviction using
a “negative” tournament to remove a low-fitness candidate and keep the population
size constant (line 14). The Fitness function in Figure 7.2 penalizes those variants that
fail any test case with an infinitely bad fitness value, and they are quickly purged
from the population. Eventually, the fittest candidate optimization is identified,
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minimized to remove unnecessary or redundant changes (Section 6.3.2.3), and is
returned as the result.

7.2

Evaluation

We empirically evaluate both the ability of GOA to reduce energy consumption
across multiple population benchmark applications and hardware platforms, and we
evaluate the degree to which these optimizations retain program functionality.
We evaluate the effectiveness of GOA against the popular PARSEC benchmark
applications (Section 7.2.1). In addition to the program assembler, GOA requires a
fitness function and characteristic test suite. We develop an energy model which is
appropriate for use as a fitness function (Section 7.2.3). The PARSEC applications
include multiple tests, from which we choose the smallest test which produces a
runtime of at least one second on each hardware platform. After running GOA, we
evaluate the evolved optimizations using physical wall-plug energy measurements.

7.2.1

Benchmarks
Program
blackscholes
bodytrack
ferret
fluidanimate
freqmine
swaptions
vips
x264
total

C/C++ LOC ASM LOC
510
7,932
14,513
955,888
15,188
288,981
11,424
44,681
2,710
104,722
1,649
61,134
142,019
132,012
37,454
111,718
225,467
1,707,068

Description
Finance modeling
Human video tracking
Image search engine
Fluid dynamics animation
Frequent itemset mining
Portfolio pricing
Image transformation
MPEG-4 video encoder

Table 7.1: Selected PARSEC benchmark applications.
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We use the PARSEC [17] benchmark suite of programs representing “emerging
workloads.” We evaluate GOA on all of the PARSEC applications that produce
testable output and include more than one input set. Testable output is required
to ensure that the optimizations retain required functionality. Multiple input sets
are required because we use one (training) input set during the GOA optimization
and separate held-out (“testing”) inputs to test after GOA completes its optimization (Section 7.2.2). The eight applications satisfying these requirements are shown
with their sizes and brief descriptions in Table 7.1. Two PARSEC applications were
excluded because they did not support this experimental design: raytrace which
does not produce any testable output, and facesim which does not provide multiple
input sets.
We evaluate on Intel Core i7 and AMD Opteron machines. The Intel system
has 4 physical cores, Hyper-Threading, and 8 GB of memory, and it is indicative of
desktop or personal developer hardware. The AMD system has 48 cores and 128 GB
of memory, and is representative of more powerful server-class machines.
We compare the performance of GOA’s optimized executables to the original
executable compiled using the PARSEC tool with its built-in optimization flags or
the gcc “–Ox” flag that has the least energy consumption.

7.2.2

Held-Out Tests

We use a large held-out test suite to evaluate the degree to which the optimizations
found by GOA customize the program semantics to the training test and therefore
lose generality. For each benchmark besides blackscholes, we randomly generate
100 sets of command-line arguments from the valid flags accepted by the program.
The blackscholes application accepts no flags, but does read an input file containing
a number of financial records. We generated 100 test input files for blackscholes
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by randomly sampling between 214 and 220 records from the set of all records that
appear in the multiple PARSEC blackscholes tests.
Each test was run using the original program and its output as an oracle to
validate the output of the optimized program. We only use combinations of flags
which are accepted by the original program, and for which the original program
consistently generates the same output.
We evaluate optimized programs in Section 7.2.5 by comparing their outputs
against the oracle output. In most cases, we used a binary comparison between output files. However, for x264 tests producing video output, we find binary exactness
overly constraining and instead use manual visual comparison to determine output
correctness.

7.2.3

Energy Model

Our fitness function uses a linear energy model based on process-specific hardware
counters similar to that developed by Shen et al. [150]. We simplify their model in
that we:

• We do not build workload-specific power models. Instead, we develop one
power model per machine trained to fit multiple workloads and use this single
model for every benchmark on that machine.
• We do not consider shared resources, instead we only augment performancebased terms with a single constant base Cconst energy draw for the machine.

The linear energy model shown in Equation 7.1 combines the hardware counters
described in Table 7.2 into a scalar estimate of energy consumption.
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(7.1)

The trained values for the model coefficients are given in Table 7.2. They were
obtained empirically for each target architecture, using data collected across multiple
execution of each PARSEC benchmark, the SPEC CPU benchmark suite, and the
sleep UNIX utility. For each program, we collected the performance counters as
well as the average Watts consumed, as measured by a physical wall plug meter.
We combined these data in a linear regression to determine the coefficients shown in
Table 7.2.
Coefficient
Cconst
Cins
Cflops
Ctca
Cmem

Description
constant power draw
instructions
floating point ops.
cache accesses
cache misses

Intel
AMD
(4-core) (48-core)
31.530
394.74
20.490
-83.68
9.838
60.23
-4.102
-16.38
2962.678 -4209.09

Table 7.2: Power model coefficients.

The coefficients we obtained differ significantly between the two architectures.
The disparity between the AMD and Intel coefficients is likely explained by significant
differences in the size and class of the two machines. For example, the 13× increase
in idle power of the AMD machine as compared to the Intel machine is reasonable
given the presence of 12 times as many cores, and 15 times as much memory.
Even without our simplifications, the predictive power of linear models is rarely
perfect. McCullough et al. note that on a simple multi-core system, CPU-prediction
error is often 10–14% with 150% worst case error prediction [109]. We checked for
the presence of overfitting using 10-fold cross-validation and found a 4–6% difference
in the average absolute error, which is sufficiently accurate to guide our evolutionary
search.
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Program
blackscholes
bodytrack
ferret
fluidanimate
freqmine
swaptions
vips
x264
average

Program Changes
Code Edits
Binary Size
AMD Intel AMD
Intel
120
3 -8.2%
0%
19656
3 -38.7% 0%
11
1 84.8% 0%
27
51 -3.3%
11.4%
14
54 18.7% 34.9%
141
6 27.0% 18.5%
57
66 -52.8% 0%
34
2 0%
0%
2507.5 23.3 3.4%
8.1%

Energy Reduction
Training
Held-out
AMD Intel
AMD Intel
92.1% 85.5% 91.7% 83.3%
0%
0%
0.6%
0%
1.6%
0%
5.9%
0%
10.2% 0%
—
—
3.2%
0%
3.3%
-1.6%
42.5% 34.4% 41.6% 36.9%
21.7% 20.3% 21.3% —
8.3%
0%
9.2%
0%
22.5% 17.5% 24.8% 19.8%
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Runtime Reduction
Held-out
AMD Intel
91.7% 81.3%
0.3%
0.2%
-7.9% -0.1%
—
—
3.2%
0.1%
42.0% 36.6%
29.8% —
9.8%
0%
24.1% 19.7%

Table 7.3: GOA energy-optimization results on PARSEC applications.

We find that our models have an average of 7% absolute error relative to the
wall-socket measurements. The overhead of collecting hardware counter values has
no noticeable impact on our test suite run time. Thus, our power model is both
sufficiently efficient and accurate to serve as our fitness function.
The Intel Performance Counter Monitor (PCM) counter can also be used to estimate energy consumption. We did not use this counter because the model used by
the PCM to estimate energy is not public, and because it estimates energy consumption for an entire socket and does not provide the per-process energy consumption
required by our technique.

7.2.4

Energy Reduction Results

The results of our energy consumption minimization are shown in Table 7.3. The
“Code Edits” column shows the number of unified diffs (as calculated using the GNU
diffutils package4 ) between the original and optimized versions of the assembly program. “Binary Size” indicates the change in size of the compiled executable. The
“Energy Reduction” columns report the physically measured energy reduction compared to the original required to run the tests in the fitness function (“Training
4 http://www.gnu.org/software/diffutils/
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Workload”) or to run all other PARSEC workloads for that benchmark (“Held-Out
Workloads”). For example, if the original program requires 100 units and the optimized version requires 20, that corresponds to an 80% reduction. The “Runtime
Reduction” columns report the decrease in runtime compared to the original. In
some cases, the measured energy reduction is statistically indistinguishable from
zero (p > 0.05). Note that for some benchmarks (e.g., bodytrack), although there is
no measured improvement, the minimization algorithm maintains modeled improvement, resulting in a new binary. We do not report energy reduction on workloads for
which the optimized variant did not pass the associated tests (indicated by dashes).
GOA found optimizations that reduced energy consumption in many cases,
with the overall reduction on the supplied workloads averaging 20%. Although in
some cases—such as in bodytrack on AMD or bodytrack, ferret, fluidanimate,
freqmine and x264 on Intel—GOA failed to find optimizations that reduced energy
consumption, it found optimizations that reduce energy consumption by an order of
magnitude for blackscholes and by almost half for swaptions on both systems.
We find that CPU-bound programs are more amenable to improvement than those
that perform large amounts of disk IO. This result suggests that GOA is likely better
at generating efficient sequences of executing assembly instructions than at improving patterns of memory access. Overall, when considering only those programs with
non-zero improvement, average energy reduction was 39%. The increased improvement on held-out workloads compared to training workloads was expected given the
increased comparative size and runtime of most held-out workloads reducing the
impact of startup time on total energy consumption.
In most benchmark programs energy reduction is very similar to runtime reduction (see Columns “Energy Reduction” and “Runtime Reduction”, Table 7.3). This
is not surprising given the important role of time in our energy model. However, in
some cases (e.g., ferret) energy was reduced despite an increase in runtime, and
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in other cases (e.g., vips) energy consumption decreased significantly more than
runtime.
Although some optimizations are easily analyzed through inspection of assembly
patches (e.g., the deletion of “call im_region_black” from vips skipping unnecessary zeroing of a region of data), many optimizations produce unintuitive assembly
changes that are most easily analyzed using profiling tools. Such inspection reveals
optimizations (Section 7.2.6) that run the gamut from removing explicit semantic
inefficiencies in blackscholes, to re-organizing assembly instructions in swaptions
in such a way as to decrease the rate of branch mispredictions, to exploring trade
offs between re-calculating values or looking them up in memory in vips. The AMD
versions of fluidanimate and x264 seem to improve performance by reducing idle
cycles spent waiting for off-chip resources.

7.2.5

Program Correctness Results
Functionality on
Held Out Tests
Program
AMD Intel
blackscholes 100% 100%
bodytrack
92%
100%
ferret
100% 100%
fluidanimate 6%
31%
freqmine
100% 100%
swaptions
100% 100%
vips
100% 100%
x264
27%
100%
average
78.1% 91.4%

Table 7.4: GOA correctness of optimized programs on held out test suites.
Strengths of GOA include its ability to change program semantics and to customize programs to the training machine, environment and workload. Unfortunately
these abilities raise the possibility that program optimizations may change program
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semantics to over-fit the training workload and break program behavior on held-out
workloads. We experimentally investigate the severity of this threat by running our
optimized program variants against large suites of held-out tests (Section 7.2.2). The
results are given in Table 7.4.
We find that the majority of the discovered optimizations fully preserve program
behavior across the entire suite of held-out tests. We believe that the post-processing
minimization step is largely responsible for this surprising protection of un-tested
behavior. This is because the minimization removes all mutations which do not
directly benefit the runtime properties of the program on the training workload,
having the result of removing most mutations occurring in unexercised portions of
the program.

7.2.6

Case Studies

This section describes three examples illustrating different types of energy optimizations found by GOA.
blackscholes implements a partial differential-equation model of a financial market. Because the model runs so quickly, the benchmark artificially adds an outer
loop that executes the model multiple times. These redundant calculations are not
detected by standard static compiler analyses. The validated blackscholes optimization returned by GOA discovered and removed the redundant calculation on
both AMD and Intel hardware. However, the optimization strategy differed between
the two architectures. In the Intel case, a “subl” instruction was removed, preventing
multiple executions of a loop, while in the AMD case a similar effect was obtained
by inserting a literal address which (due to the density of valid x86 instructions in
random data [12]) is interpreted as valid x86 code to jump out of the loop, skipping
redundant calculations.
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GOA also finds hardware-specific optimizations in swaptions; a benchmark
which prices portfolios. On AMD systems, GOA reduces the total swaptions energy
consumption by 42%. We believe this improvement is mostly due to the reduction in
the rate of branch miss-prediction. Although it is not practical for general compilers to reason about branch prediction strategies for every possible processor, GOA
naturally finds such environment-specific specialized adaptations.
We found that no single edit (or small subset of edits) accounted for this improvement. Rather, many edits distributed throughout the swaptions program collectively reduced mispredictions. Typical edits included insertions and deletions of
.quad, .long, .byte, etc., all of which change the absolute position of the executing
code. Absolute position affects branch prediction when the value of the instruction
pointer is used to index into the appropriate predictor. For example, AMD [70,
Section 6.2] advocates inserting REP before returns in certain scenarios.
Finally, GOA finds unintuitive optimizations. In the vips image processing program, it found an optimization that reduced the total energy used by 20.3% on the
Intel system. The optimization actually increased cache misses by 20× but decreased
the number of executed instructions by 30%, in effect trading increased off-chip communication for decreased computation. This sort of trade-off in resource consumption
is something an experienced developer might attempt, and it is encouraging that our
technique is able to find an instance of such a trade-off automatically.

7.3

Discussion

This chapter describes Genetic Optimization Algorithm (GOA), an application that
searches within the neutral networks defined by functional program properties in
order to optimize nonfunctional program properties. GOA is powerful, significantly
reducing energy consumption beyond the best available compiler optimizations and
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capable of customizing software to a target execution environment; simple, leveraging widely available tools such as compilers and profilers and requiring no code
annotation or technical expertise; and general, using generic program transformations (Section 3.1) to target multiple measurable objective functions and applicable
to any program that compiles to x86 assembly code.
One notable aspect of the optimizations found by GOA is the size of the optimizations in terms of mutational distance (as shown in Section 3.5) from the original
program (e.g., the swaptions optimization reviewed in Section 7.2.6 requires hundreds of disparate edits). In contrast, the absolute size of program modifications
resulting from the evolutionary applications presented in Chapters 5 and 6, and
prior work such as Genprog is very small. Minimized repairs in Chapter 6 typically
are only differ from the original in two bytes. In a review of the repairs found by
Genprog in a large systematic study [95], all repairs could be reduced to at most two
mutation operations.
This difference may suggest a connection between continuous fitness landscapes,
which provide continual feedback to the evolutionary search technique as described
in Section 3.6.4, and the power of evolutionary techniques. If such a connection holds
for functional properties of real-world software, it may motivate the use of automated
techniques of “smoothing” the fitness landscapes defined by existing test suites such
as those described in Section 8.2.2.
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Chapter 8
Future Directions and Conclusion

This dissertation describes an empirical investigation of the robustness of real-world
software in the face of randomized mutations, and characterizes the resulting large
neutral networks of in program space. This robustness is both the result of the
evolutionary development of the current software development ecosystem and an
indication that existing software is amenable to the use of evolutionary tools for
software maintenance and improvement.
Techniques were demonstrated that automatically improve software robustness,
correctness, and efficiency. This work however only begins to probe the horizon of
potential automated evolutionary software engineering techniques. In the long term,
our aim is the fulfillment of the ultimate goals of both the software engineering and
the evolutionary computation communities: the full automation of most software
development tasks.
Such an ambitious long-term goal is very distant from the present state of the
art. The remainder of this chapter highlights some challenges and opportunities for
near-term work in this area.
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Challenges

Before evolutionary techniques can become a regular part of the software development work-flow, change is needed both in the applications themselves and in the
culture and expectations of the developers. While the tools presented herein demonstrate a wide range of applicability and power of transformation they are lacking in
two essential areas.
Developer interface: This includes the related areas of semantics preservation,
communicating development goals to evolutionary processes, and integration into the
software development life-cycle.
• This dissertation does not address issues of rigorously limiting the potential
impact of program transformations on program behavior. Wide spread use of
these applications might require additional techniques for providing guarantees
ensuring the protection of certain program properties or semantics.
• Communicating goals to evolutionary program improvement techniques. This
challenge is being addressed by the software testing community. Advances
in software testing allowing developers to more easily and rigorously enforce
desired program properties through tests will directly transfer to test-driven
evolutionary techniques.
• Presentation automatically generated transformation to developers and incorporating evolved transformations into the life-cycle of software. Put another
way, collaboration between human and evolutionary drivers of software evolution is not currently supported. This depends on the program representation
used and is discussed in greater length in Section 3.6.3.
Novel functionality: This dissertation focuses on the improvement of existing software functionality, either through patching defects and vulnerabilities or by
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changing nonfunctional runtime properties. Although neutral networks are hypothesized to enable the evolution of new functionality in biological systems, the results
presented herein do not yet demonstrate the evolution of truly significant novel functionality in software systems.

8.2

Opportunities

There are a number of “next steps” for this work in a variety of directions, some of
which address the specific challenges presented in the previous section. This section
details a number of these opportunities for future work.

8.2.1

Verification

A major hurdle to the incorporation of evolutionary techniques into standard software
development work-flows is the lack of formal verification of the effects or the limits
of evolutionary program transformations. There are a number of options for work
in this area, incorporating both emerging and long standing tools. Any of these
options could be applied to the applications presented in this work either as a postprocessing verification step (for processes with longer running times) or as part of
the fitness function used by the evolutionary algorithm (for processes which require
less execution time). The remainder of this section touches upon possible candidate
tools and techniques broken out by the type of analysis performed; diff analysis,
static analysis, and dynamic analysis.

8.2.1.1

Diff analysis

The evolutionary transformations presented in this work are typically presented as
standard diffs at the source code, assembler or binary level for the AST, ASM and
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ELF representations respectively. There are existing techniques for analyzing diffs
for their impact on program semantics [149, 160, Section IV.B].
A potential weakness of the optimization technique presented in Chapter 7 is
the possibility of changing the semantics of the optimized program. This weakness
could be addressed by developing a tool that iterates through every hunk in the
assembler diff, rejecting those that can not be formally proven to preserve semantics.
Depending on the efficiency, such a tool could be applied after every mutation during
the execution of GOA, or it could be saved and run once as a post-processing step.
There are a number of emerging techniques and models for proving important
properties of assembler code [73, 78, 149] some of which can be directly applicable to
proving semantic equivalence between sequences of assembler code [137, Section 4.1].

8.2.1.2

Static analysis

Automated tools for the static analysis of software source code or assembler code are
widely in research and by software developers. Programs to assess software quality
have been in use for decades, for example Stephen Johnson’s lint [76], which flagged
suspicious source code likely to contain bugs, emerged not long after the creation
of the first portable C compiler. Modern static analysis tools include commercial
products [44], and open source tools [93], looking for bugs in commonly misused
patterns [65, 16] or in the flow of data through a program [6, 11]. In addition,
code complexity metrics commonly used in industrial settings can be automatically
computed from source code [108].
Such tools could be incorporated into evolutionary techniques, either as components of the fitness function or as a final post-process step. In these roles, such tools
would ensure that metrics of code quality or complexity improve over the course of
a run, or they would provide guarantees of minimum quality scores at the end of a
run respectively.
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Dynamic analysis

In addition to simply testing program output, more sophisticated methods of dynamically assessing software behavior could provide increased confidence in evolved
program variants. To select just one example, invariant detection systems such as
Daikon [46] could be used to ensure that invariants found in the original program
are maintained in evolved variants.

8.2.2

Continuous Functional Evaluation

As discussed in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.6.4, the lack of smooth gradients in the functional fitness landscapes (defined by boolean PASS or FAIL valued tests) used in this
dissertation may be limiting the effectiveness of evolutionary search techniques. The
evolution of truly novel functionality might require new fitness functions describing
continuous functional fitness landscapes.
This section describes methods for automatically smoothing fitness landscapes to
provide guidance to evolutionary search technique along flat portions of the fitness
landscape. The promise of fitness functions with increased granularity is demonstrated in Chapter 6, in which ternary PASS, FAIL, or ERROR vulnerability tests
compensate for the lack of a regression test suite.
The following two examples illustrate how we might automatically convert existing test suites from boolean PASS or FAIL valued functions into continuous functions
with gradients capable of guiding evolutionary search. An empirical investigation of
their feasibility, practical, and impact on performance would be informative.

1. Many test cases evaluate success by computing a diff between program output
and oracle output. Such tests typically return a boolean indicating if the results
are identical or different. Tests of this form could easily and automatically be
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converted to return the degree of difference, e.g., in terms of edit distance or
possibly domain-specific metrics such as numeric difference for numeric output
(e.g., using tools such as numdiff1 ).
2. In many cases, the output from a test is either successful exit (ERRNO equal
to 0) or crashing. An alternative would be to compute the number of unique
values taken by the program counter during the course of test execution, which
might provide an informative gradient to the fitness landscape. Such a metric
would indicate how “far” the program gets before crashing, and by limiting the
count to unique values of the program counter this test would avoid incorrectly
assigning higher fitness infinite loops.

Although these ideas seem to hold promise, they need to be implemented and
evaluated. There currently exist large benchmark suites of software defects which
are not repairable using the current state of the art automated program repair techniques [95]. Improving the performance of automated repair techniques against such
benchmarks would provide a useful metric of the efficacy of these sorts of automated
test suite enhancements.

8.2.3

Heterologous Crossover

The re-use of existing software in new projects or contexts is a long standing staple
of software development [90, 80]. Moving functionality between different pieces of
software is an important intermediate (and arguably sufficient alternative) to the
evolution of novel functionality [9]. Crossover is the evolutionary operation responsible for exchanging genetic material between individuals. This section describes
extension of the crossover used in this dissertation to allow for genetic material to
be shared between heterogeneous software projects.
1 http://www.nongnu.org/numdiff
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Heterologous Crossover
∼

(a) Homologous Crossover

(b) Heterologous Crossover

Figure 8.1: Homologous and heterologous crossover.

Existing techniques use homologous crossover [52], meaning when crossover is
performed a single location is selected and is used between each parent (Figure 8.1
Panel a). This works in homogeneous populations which share a common ancestor
and which tend to have equivalent functionality at each location. However, it is not an
appropriate technique for sharing functionality between heterogeneous individuals,
including; assembler representations compiled using different compiler flags (e.g., gcc
-S and gcc -fast), different major versions of a program, different implementations
of a program or even entirely unrelated programs. Therefore an important area
of future work is the evolution of a heterogeneous crossover operation capable of
transferring functionality between heterogeneous software.

One possible approach would replace the use of crossover points at offsets in the
genome, with a search for crossover locations in each parent that share a similar
syntactic context (Figure 8.1 Panel b). Some initial work on related techniques in
the evolutionary computation community shows promise (e.g., through the use of
common sub-sequences between parents as crossover points [68]). Effective heterologous crossover techniques could lead to the sharing optimizations and functionality
between different compiler optimizations for a single software project, or even sharing
information between different software projects.
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Figure 8.2: Overview of a proposed system for hardening software through the iterative execution of an automated technique for exploit generation and an automated
evolutionary technique for defect repair.

8.2.4

Evolutionary Hardening

Binary executables of unknown or proprietary provenance can place significant holes
in otherwise secure or trusted validated computer systems. Even on unvalidated
platforms such as desktop machines, binary drivers often open significant security
vulnerabilities.
Recent advances in symbolic and concolic execution have produced multiple tools
for the automated testing of software [26], and even testing of black-box binary executables without access to the source code [29]. Such tools can be used to automatically find tests indicating vulnerabilities in black-box binaries. A system which
pairs such an automated test generation tool, with an automated program repair
tool such as the ELF-level evolutionary program repair (Chapter 5) could be used
for hardening of black-box binary executables.
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Figure 8.2 presents a schematic for how such a tool would operate. In this scenario, the technique would begin with a (possibly empty) regression test suite. The
binary executable would then iteratively pass between the test generation engine
(labeled “Fuzz Tester” in Figure 8.2) yielding a new test indicating a vulnerability
in the program, which would then be added to the test suite augmenting the fitness
function of the continually running evolutionary program repair process (represented
as a dotted box in Figure 8.2). Whenever a version of the program is found that
passes all tests, this “repaired” version would be passed back to the test generation
engine and the process iterated.
Using such a process to automatically harden black-box executables to the limits
of the test generation or program repair engine could greatly improve the security and
robustness of many software systems. Initial experiments using simple fuzz testing
engines show promise.2

8.3

Conclusion

Over the past fifty years software developers have been selecting, reusing and modifying software development tools, code, and design patterns. This history of technological development, through a process mirroring natural selection, may have produced
software with the surprisingly biological features that were illuminated in this work,
including software mutational robustness, large software neutral networks, and the
amenability of extant software to improvement through automated evolutionary processes.
This work establishes that real-world software is amenable to modification
through randomized program transformations. This discovery may help explain the
recent success of evolutionary software repair techniques (cf. Genprog [96]), and it
2 https://github.com/eschulte/fuzz-hardening
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contradicts many of the assumptions of the most closely related prior work in this
area (cf. mutation testing [74]). This discovery opens the door to the application of
evolutionary techniques to the automation of many common software development
tasks, including the examples given in Chapters 4, 5, and 7, which improve software
robustness, correctness and performance. The tools, techniques, and analysis developed to support this work will hopefully establish the foundation for further practical
work, unify the fields of evolutionary computation and software engineering, and lead
towards the eventual fulfillment of their mutual goal: the increased automation of
software development.
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Appendix A
Software Tools
This chapter describes the software tools used in this work in enough detail to support
reproduction and extension of our results [23, 110]. All software developed as part of
this dissertation is freely available under open-source licensing. Section A.1 describes
the original Genprog software used in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Section A.2 describes the
software evolution library used in Chapters 3, 6, and 7, and describes command line
drivers for mutation at the Cil, Clang and LLVM levels. Section A.3 describes the
tooling used to patch the closed source NETGEAR binary in Chapter 6. Section A.4
describes the GOA implementation, used in Chapter 7.

A.1

Genprog

An implementation of the Genprog automated evolutionary software repair technique
is available online.1 Genprog version 1.0 was used for the initial mutational robustness experiments presented in Chapter 3. Instructions for usage should are available
alongside the source. My early work on the ASM and ELF program representations
(Chapter 5 and Sections 3.3.2.1 through 3.3.2.4, and 3.4.1) was implemented within
1 http://dijkstra.cs.virginia.edu/genprog
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this software framework. However, later work (Sections 3.3.2.5, and 6 and Chapter 7)
uses the software evolution library described in Section A.2.

A.2

Software Evolution Library

The SOFTWARE-EVOLUTION library enables the programmatic modification and
evaluation of extant software. The library defines a generic API which abstracts
over multiple program representation backends, and provides higher-level functions
for evolutionary program modification which make use of this API. The library is
implemented in common lisp and should be adaptable to any ANSI common lisp
implementation [4]. The library was tested and is known to work with Steel Bank
Common Lisp (SBCL) and clozure Common Lisp (CCL). Documentation is provided
in the software evolution manual [139], which is available online.2 The implementation is available online,3 and can be installed using the QuickLisp4 Common Lisp
package management system.
The structure of the SOFTWARE-EVOLUTION library is shown in Figure A.1.
A common interface defines an abstraction over multiple software representations
and provides a uniform set of methods for program transformation and evaluation.
Methods supporting program modification are implemented on top of these general methods including both evolutionary and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
search techniques. MCMC techniques have found recent use in automated techniques
of software optimization [137].
The SOFTWARE-EVOLUTION library requires the following dependencies
which were also implemented as part of this dissertation. The ELF library for the
2 http://eschulte.github.io/software-evolution
3 https://github.com/eschulte/software-evolution
4 http://www.quicklisp.org/beta
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ELF
| |
lisp
| |
asm
|
|---------------| |-------------| |-------------| |------------|
|
Abstract
| | Executable | | lisp source | | assembly |
| Syntax Tree | | Linkable
| +-------------+ |
code
|
+---------------+ |
Format
|
+------------+
|
+-------------+
|
+--------------+-------------------+
+------------------+
|
|
|
|
asm-range
|
+-------+ +----------------+
+----------+
|------------------|
| Clang | |
CIL
|
|
LLVM
|
| memory efficient |
|-------| |----------------|
|----------|
+------------------+
| C AST | | C Intermediate |
| LLVM IR |
+-------+ |
Language
|
+----------+
+----------------+

Figure A.1: High-level design of the software evolution library.

programmatic manipulation of ELF files.5 The DELTA-DEBUG library for programmatic and command line delta debugging.6
Optional external command line drivers are used for the Cil, CLang, and LLVM
program representations, these are listed in Table A.1. These drivers provide uniform
interfaces to these diverse external tools.

5 https://github.com/eschulte/elf
6 https://github.com/eschulte/delta-debug

Appendix A. Software Tools
Tool
Cil [116]
CLang [92]
LLVM [93]

131

URL
https://github.com/eschulte/cil-mutate
https://github.com/eschulte/clang-mutate
https://github.com/eschulte/llvm-mutate

Table A.1: Command line executables implementing program mutation.

A.3

NETGEAR Repair

Full reproduction instructions,7 code, and tooling used to perform the NETGEAR
binary repair are available online.8 These tools can be used to automatically change
the behavior of other binary ELF executables, making it possible to customize and
alter binary executables independent of the software’s developer.

A.4

Genetic Optimization Algorithm

The implementation of the Genetic Optimization Algorithm (GOA) introduced in
Chapter 7 is available online.9 The implementation can be compiled to a command
line executable capable of optimizing user-specified nonfunctional fitness functions.
Detailed installation and usage instruction are provided with the program source and
in the README.md file in the source code repository.
GOA is implemented using the SOFTWARE-EVOLUTION library (Section A.2).

7 http://eschulte.github.io/netgear-repair/INSTRUCTIONS.html
8 https://github.com/eschulte/netgear-repair
9 https://github.com/eschulte/goa

— the now outdated version used to generate
the experimental results presented in Chapter 7 is preserved at https://github.com/
eschulte/goa/tree/asplos2014
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Appendix B
Data Sets
The experiments described in this work make use of a number of suites of benchmark
programs. This Appendix lists the benchmark programs used in this work, with links
at which they can be obtained and pointers to where they were used herein.

• A benchmark collection of open source systems programs is available online.1
These benchmark programs are used in Section 3.3 and in Chapter 4. The raw
experimental data presented in Chapter 3.3 is also available.2
• The Siemens Software-artifact Infrastructure Repository3 is used in experiments in Section 3.3.
• Multiple sorting algorithms originally from Rosetta Code4 are available online5 along with a complete test suite and source code required to reproduce a
number of experiments. These sorting algorithms are used in Chapter 3.
1 https://cs.unm.edu/~eschulte/repro/robustness.tar.bz2
2 https://cs.unm.edu/~eschulte/repro/robustness-results.tar.bz2
3 http://sir.unl.edu
4 http://rosettacode.org
5 https://github.com/eschulte/sorters
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• Embedded Repair benchmark programs used in Chapter 5 are available online.6
The raw experimental data presented in Chapter 5 is also available.7
• The NETGEAR firmware used in Chapter 6 can be downloaded directly from
the NETGEAR website,8 however an archived version is also available.9
• The PARSEC 3.0 benchmark applications used in Chapter 7 are available online.10 Additionally, the tooling used to perform the experiments described
in Chapter 7, including downloading and unpacking benchmarks, is available
online.11

6 https://cs.unm.edu/~eschulte/repro/embedded.tar.bz2
7 https://cs.unm.edu/~eschulte/repro/embedded-results.tar.bz2
8 http://www.downloads.netgear.com/files/GDC/WNDR3700V4/WNDR3700V4_V1.0.1.

42.zip
9 https://github.com/eschulte/netgear-repair/blob/master/stuff/WNDR3700V4_
V1.0.1.42.zip
10 http://parsec.cs.princeton.edu/
11 https://github.com/eschulte/goa/tree/asplos2014
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Glossary
ARM Family of reduced instruction set architectures developed by the British company “ARM Holdings” 85
ASE Automated Software Engineering 4, 75
ASM assembler 9, 12, 17, 18, 20–23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 37, 39–42, 46, 51, 53–55, 57–60,
66, 74, 75, 78–83, 103, 119, 128
ASPLOS Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems 4, 75, 102
AST Abstract Syntax Tree 10, 15, 17–20, 22, 25, 27, 31–33, 37, 38, 41, 51, 52, 54,
55, 65, 66, 70, 74, 75, 78–83, 119
CCL clozure Common Lisp 129
Cil C Intermediate Language 15, 18, 20, 25, 27, 31, 40, 41, 52, 66, 70, 74, 78–81,
83, 130, 131
CISC Complex Instruction Set Computer 21, 55
CLang C Language family frontend for LLVM 18, 19, 25, 27, 40, 41, 65, 130, 131
crossover Genetic transformation combining the genetic material from two genotypes to produce at least one new genotype. 10, 17, 18, 21, 23, 88–91, 96, 106,
122, 123

Glossary

135

delta debugging a technique of systematically narrowing down a set while maintaining a specified property. Initially developed to isolate a minimal failureinducing input to identify bugs in software. 16, 92, 99, 130
drift the change in genetic material in a population under random sampling 8, 43,
46
ELF Executable and Linkable Format 9, 18, 21, 22, 25, 27, 40, 41, 66, 74, 75, 78–81,
83–85, 88–91, 97, 99, 120, 124, 128, 130
environmental robustness Robustness of phenotype to changes in the environment 6
fault localization the process of determining the location of program faults 74, 75,
77, 83, 89, 97, 98
fitness landscape A space used to visualize multiple genotypes and their associated
fitness 7, 11, 18, 62, 67, 101, 116, 121, 122
functional Functionality of software as a function from inputs to behavior and
outputs 27–29, 67, 101, 115, 116, 121
GECCO the conference on Genetic and Evolutionary Computation 16
Genprog Automated evolutionary program repair technique 14–16, 85, 89, 92, 97,
106, 116, 125, 128
GOA Genetic Optimization Algorithm 101–108, 112–116, 120, 128, 131
GPEM Genetic Programming and Evolvable Machines 3, 4, 18, 69
ICSE the International Conference on Software Engineering 16
IR Intermediate Representation 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 51, 66

Glossary
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ISA Instruction Set Architecture 21
LLVM Low Level Virtual Machine 18–20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 40, 41, 51, 55, 66, 102,
130, 131
MCMC Markov Chain Monte Carlo 129
MIPS Family of reduced instruction set architectures, originally an acronym for
“Interlocked Pipeline Stages”. 21, 53, 88, 91, 95
mutation A random transformation of genetic material 1, 6–8, 10, 18, 21, 23, 32,
34, 42, 43, 45–48, 50, 57, 61, 65, 66, 70, 80, 88, 89, 92, 104, 114, 117
mutation testing Test suite coverage metric based on the ability to detect program
variants (mutants). 14, 62, 63, 65, 72, 73, 126
mutational robustness Robustness of phenotype to changes in the genotype 2, 4,
6, 8, 17, 34, 43, 74
natural selection Process by which genetic traits become more or less frequent in
a population as a function of their phenotypic effects on reproduction 1, 2, 8,
10, 61, 125
neutral network Connected network in program space. Nodes in this network are
neutral variants, nodes are connected by an edge if one may be reachable by
applying a single mutation to the other 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 17, 18, 45, 60, 61, 68–70,
115, 117, 119, 125
neutral variant A variant which retains required phenotypic functionality present
in an original ancestor 29, 45, 54, 60, 64, 65, 68–70, 72
nonfunctional Runtime properties of software execution not directly specified by
functional properties 28, 29, 67, 101, 115, 119, 131

Glossary
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program space The space of possible programs defined by a program representation and transformations 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55
RISC Reduced Instruction Set Computer 21
SBCL Steel Bank Common Lisp 129
SBST Search-Based Software Testing 16
software mutational robustness Mutational robustness of software 1, 18, 29, 30,
32, 34, 40, 41, 43, 54, 60, 100, 125
specification Requirements of program execution and behavior. Specifications may
be written or implied and may be either formally stated in mathematical or
programmatic terms or informally stated. 1, 4, 22, 28, 29, 37–39, 65, 104
SSA Static Single Assignment 20
steady state an variation of the traditional genetic algorithm in which no explicit
generations are used 10, 93, 96, 106
variant An instance of software which has been changed through the application
mutation operations to some original program 15, 28–33, 38, 39, 42–44, 46, 66,
68–71, 83, 89, 92, 106
x86 Family of complex instruction set architectures based on the Intel 8086 CPU.
9, 21, 22, 85, 114, 116
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